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“Omalous” Autonomy 
Perry Dane.∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
One puzzle of religious institutional autonomy and the free 
exercise of religion is, of course, this: In 1990, the Supreme Court 
held in Employment Division v. Smith that, in most cases, religious 
beliefs create no special constitutional right to an exemption from 
“neutral, generally applicable” laws.1 The Court in Smith largely 
discarded a balancing test it had embraced in Sherbert v. Verner 
almost thirty years earlier, under which laws that imposed “incidental 
burden[s] on the free exercise of . . . religion” would be struck down 
unless justified by a “‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a 
subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate.’”2 Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Smith concluded that, while the 
compelling government interest requirement in other areas of 
constitutional law establishes “constitutional norms,” its role in Free 
Exercise jurisprudence since Sherbert only created a “constitutional 
anomaly”3 by granting religious believers a personalized exemption 
from otherwise valid laws.4  In some ways, Smith returned the Court 
to the position it had famously taken as early as 1879 in Reynolds v. 
United States.5
But still sitting in an often-overlooked corner of religion and law 
jurisprudence is a distinct set of doctrines, covering a variety of issues 
that come under the general rubric of institutional autonomy, by 
which American churches and religious communities are insulated 
 ∗  Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Camden. I am particularly grateful to Jay 
Feinman, Steven Friedell, and Sally Goldfarb for helping me think through some of the issues 
raised in this Article.  They are not, however, responsible for any of the conclusions I reach. 
 1. 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990) (rejecting the argument that the Free Exercise Clause 
requires an exemption from a state drug law for sacramental use of peyote by members of the 
Native American Church). 
 2. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 
(1963)). 
 3. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885–86. 
 4. Id. at 878–79. 
 5. 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879). 
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from the full reach of the neutral, generally applicable laws to which 
comparable nonreligious institutions are subject. For example, 
religious communities are generally not subject to antidiscrimination 
laws when it comes to the employment of clergy,6 nor are they 
subject to the same requirements regarding the structure of 
corporate governance.7
So, the question arises, does religious institutional autonomy 
survive Smith?8 More to the point—and putting aside the lawyerly 
game of narrowing and distinguishing precedent—does institutional 
autonomy survive the theory that underlies Smith?9
This is an important practical question: I devote the last half of 
this Article, for example, to the implications of religious institutional 
autonomy for legal responses to the current clergy sexual abuse 
scandal. In one sense, though, it is also a silly question, even as 
amended. The doctrine of institutional autonomy was in place long 
before Sherbert. Watson v. Jones,10 the Marbury of institutional 
autonomy, dates from the same era as Reynolds itself, and courts 
recognized the doctrine, whether as a para-constitutional or 
 6. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 104–15 and accompanying text. 
 8. See generally Lee Boothby, Religious Freedom in the United States Following City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 2 NEXUS, Fall 1997, at 111, 117–18 (“Smith in no way encroaches upon the 
long line of church autonomy cases.”); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government To 
Regulate Class Discrimination By Religious Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY 
L.J. 1189, 1231 (1994); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts 
over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1906 (1998); Christopher R. Farrell, Note, 
Ecclesiastical Abstention and the Crisis in the Catholic Church, 19 J.L. & POL. 109, 127 (2003). 
 9. For a strong argument that Smith is incompatible with traditional institutional 
religious autonomy, see David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise 
Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241, 264–65 (1995) (arguing that 
deferring to a religious polity “represents one type of constitutionally compelled religious 
exemption. . . . Where an organized religion seeks a free exercise exemption, the case presents 
somewhat different issues than an individual believer’s exemption claim. Nonetheless, 
individual exemption and institutional exemption cases follow from a common premise. In 
both types of cases, claimants seek exemptions from the application of neutral laws or legal 
principles. If one abandons free exercise exemptions, then one also should reject church 
autonomy principles. In church autonomy cases, courts cannot both give independent meaning 
to the Free Exercise Clause, and reject constitutionally compelled religious exemptions.” 
(citations omitted)) . 
 10. 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (affirming, as a common law principle, that courts should defer 
to ecclesiastical governing bodies in adjudicating intrachurch property disputes). Watson, of 
course, reflected a trend that had already been developing in other courts. For a broad 
historical treatment of the development of ideas about religious institutional autonomy in 
American law, see Bernard Roberts, Note, The Common Law Sovereignty of Religious 
Lawfinders and the Free Exercise Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 211 (1991). 
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constitutional principle, during the entire period between Reynolds 
and Sherbert.11 Moreover, Smith cites the leading institutional 
autonomy cases approvingly, and Justice Scalia’s opinion suggests no 
sense of contradiction.12 Also, lower court decisions have tended to 
affirm the continued, if sometimes compromised, vitality of 
institutional autonomy.13
 11. See, e.g., Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Shepard v. 
Barkley, 247 U.S. 1 (1918); Romanian Orthodox Missionary Episcopate v. Trutza, 205 F.2d 
107 (6th Cir. 1953); Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947); First English Lutheran 
Church v. Evangelical Lutheran Synod 135 F.2d 701 (10th Cir. 1943); Satterlee v. United 
States, 20 App. D.C. 393 (D.C. 1902); Williams v. Jones, 61 So. 2d 101 (Ala. 1952); State ex 
rel. Soares v. Hebrew Congregation “Dispersed of Judah,” 31 La. Ann. 205 (La. 1879); 
Jenkins v. New Shiloh Baptist Church, 56 A.2d 788 (Md. 1948); Carter v. Papineau, 111 N.E. 
358 (Mass. 1916); Baxter v. McDonnell, 49 N.E. 667 (N.Y. 1898); Gross v. Wieand, 25 A. 50 
(Pa. 1892); First Baptist Church v. Fort, 54 S.W. 892 (Tex. 1900). 
To be sure, the development of institutional autonomy was complicated and 
inconsistent, particularly in the state courts. That history is well beyond the scope of this 
Article. My point here is simply that this development had little to do, one way or the other, 
with the path of free exercise law from Reynolds to Sherbert. Indeed, as late as 1968, the 
Georgia courts (along with others) still adhered to a version of the “departure from doctrine” 
method for resolving church property disputes. See Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights 
Presbyterian Church, 159 S.E.2d 690 (Ga. 1968). The United States Supreme Court, in 
reversing, relied on the path of autonomy jurisprudence without thinking it necessary or 
relevant to cite Sherbert. See Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
 12. In the course of describing, and approving, the strands of free exercise doctrine that 
did not involve Sherbert-style exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws, the Court 
wrote that the government may not “lend its power to one or the other side in controversies 
over religious authority or dogma.” Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) 
(citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708–25 (1976); 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 445–52; Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 95–119). 
 13. See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 656 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that Smith “does not undermine the principles of the church autonomy 
doctrine”); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(distinguishing “between the two strands of free exercise cases—restrictions on an individual’s 
actions that are based on religious beliefs and encroachments on the ability of a church to 
manage its internal affairs” and concluding that “Smith’s language is clearly directed at the 
concerns raised in the first strand of free exercise law,” which are “quite different” from those 
implicated in the second strand); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461–62 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (observing that Smith did not affect the longstanding rule precluding civil courts 
from hearing “employment discrimination suits by ministers against the church or religious 
institution employing them”); Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1131 (Colo. 1996) 
(holding that both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses precluded a minister from 
suing a church for discrimination under Title VII; distinguishing Smith); Brazauskas v. Fort 
Wayne-South Bend Diocese, 796 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. 2003) (noting that Smith “did not 
implicate the church autonomy doctrine,” though the doctrine has limits, and that Smith does 
make clear that the mere invocation of a church governing document does not “automatically 
insulate the faithful from . . . neutral laws of general applicability”). 
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The better question, then, is not whether institutional autonomy 
survives Smith, but rather why it survives—how, to what extent, and 
in what form. In other words, why, how, to what extent, and in what 
form, does a special, constitutionally required regime for churches 
survive Smith’s apparent rejection of the proposition that the 
Constitution demands a special regime for the free exercise of 
religion in general? 
One obvious response is that Smith, even read broadly, merely 
removes institutional autonomy from the realm of free exercise, but 
that the doctrine still survives under the Establishment Clause.14 This 
cannot, however, be either the whole answer or the best answer. 
First, it is counterintuitive to imagine that institutional autonomy is 
not related to principles of free exercise.15 After all, even countries 
without establishment clauses—for that matter, countries with 
established churches—respect religious institutional autonomy.16 If 
the truth be told, institutional autonomy is, strictly speaking, neither 
a matter of free exercise nor of establishment;17 rather, it can most 
 14. See, e.g., Carl Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint: Validations 
and Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL. 445, 471–73 (2002); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sexual 
Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1812–19.  
 15. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (constitutionalizing the autonomy doctrine as “a part 
of the free exercise of religion against state interference”); Doug Laycock, Towards a General 
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church 
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). 
 16. See generally CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (Gerhard Robbers 
ed., 2001). 
 17. Institutional autonomy doctrine originated in common-law rather than 
constitutional reasoning. In Kedroff, 344 U.S. 94, the Supreme Court elevated those common 
law principles to constitutional status under the rubric of the Free Exercise Clause, but it saw 
no need to justify them anew in terms drawn from its other free exercise cases. Id. at 115–16 
(“Watson v. Jones, although it contains a reference to the relations of church and state under 
our system of laws, was decided without depending upon prohibition of state interference with 
the free exercise of religion. . . . The opinion radiates, however, a spirit of freedom for religious 
organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation—in short, power to 
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of 
choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a 
part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.” (citations omitted)); cf. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 446 (describing language in Watson v. Jones as having “a clear 
constitutional ring”). 
This history is still relevant because it confirms that religious institutional autonomy is 
supported by legal threads distinct from, though woven with, the other headings of the 
Constitution’s treatment of religion. Cf. Perry Dane, The Public, the Private, and the Sacred: 
Variations on a Theme of Nomos and Narrative, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 15, 21 
(1996) (discussing “constitutional glare”—“the tendency of constitutional talk to obstruct the 
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sensibly be understood as a distinct third rubric, grounded in the 
structural logic of the relation between the juridical expressions of 
religion and the state.18 But in our constitutional dispensation, the 
least antipositivist way to express that distinct logic is by situating 
institutional autonomy at the intersection of the macroconcerns of 
the Establishment Clause and the microconcerns of the Free Exercise 
Clause.19 To try to find refuge for it in one clause as against the 
other is just false. 
Second, trying to ground religious institutional autonomy solely 
in the Establishment Clause would necessarily transform it, changing 
its focus, recasting its principles, and very likely leading it to different 
results in specific cases.20 After all, the rubric of institutional 
autonomy covers a range of discrete and diverse problems, each of 
which would deserve separate analysis under a calculus driven solely 
by Establishment Clause concern. In the end, to put it bluntly, there 
might just be less institutional autonomy if institutional autonomy 
were only an expression of disestablishment. Of course, if Smith did 
actually remove the Free Exercise Clause from the autonomy 
equation, then we might need to conclude that autonomy, though it 
survives Smith, is weakened and diluted. But that premise need not 
be conceded. 
normative work done by the rest of law, and to obscure the degree to which constitutional law 
itself is embedded in larger narratives and traditions”). 
 18. For my own arguments along these lines, see Perry Dane, The Varieties of Religious 
Autonomy, in CHURCH AUTONOMY, supra note 16, at 117 [hereinafter Dane, The Varieties of 
Religious Autonomy] (“[M]any controversies arising under our ‘Establishment Clause’ . . . can 
be understood as efforts to work out principles of separation and deference at a categorical or 
‘wholesale’ level, while many issues arising under our ‘Free Exercise Clause’ can be understood 
as arising out of the need to adjust those principles at the individual or ‘retail’ level. . . . The 
problem of ‘religious autonomy’ straddles the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, and 
therefore straddles the efforts at drawing ‘wholesale’ and ‘retail’ boundaries between religion 
and the state.”). For my more general musings on the nature and structure of the religion 
clauses, see Perry Dane, Constitutional Law and Religion, in A COMPANION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 113 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) [hereinafter 
Dane, Constitutional Law and Religion]. 
 19. See Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1980) (arguing that 
religious institutional autonomy arises out of the interaction of the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses). 
 20. For example, how would statutes providing for the special management of religious 
boards, see infra notes 104–15 and accompanying text, or the ministerial exception, see infra 
note 75 and accompanying text, be justified under the Lemon test’s secular purpose prong? See 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (requiring all statutes to have a “secular 
legislative purpose”). 
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Finally, even if institutional autonomy were properly rooted 
solely in the Establishment Clause, it would still be important to 
consider the implications of Smith. The two religion clauses, after all, 
are not hermetically sealed off from each other, and the holding in 
Smith could reasonably be understood to have at least some spillover 
effect on Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and therefore on 
institutional autonomy doctrine. Indeed, some commentators have 
already suggested that Smith’s redefinition of free exercise doctrine, 
combined with cognate developments in the Court’s Establishment 
Clause cases, suggests a new commitment to a broad principle of 
“neutrality” or “equality” in the constitutional treatment of 
religion.21 If this commitment really is at the heart of it all, it might 
very well implicate the nature and breadth of religious institutional 
autonomy as well. Indeed, one could even try to link this sort of 
putative commitment to neutrality across the spectrum of religion 
and law issues to a yet broader focus on themes of equality and 
neutrality in modern American constitutional jurisprudence22—a 
focus that is not only apparent in the role played by the Equal 
Protection Clause in contemporary constitutional consciousness,23 
 21. See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the 
Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000); 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious 
Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555 (1998); Steven G. Gey, Unity of the 
Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional Secularism, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1005, 1005–06 
n.2; Scott C. Idelman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional 
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 252–55 (2000); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive 
Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002) (discussing 
“Neutralism” as a possible general principle in the constitutional treatment of religion); Ira C. 
Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and 
Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539, 549 (2002) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Sites 
of Redemption]. 
 22. As Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle put it, 
Neutralism captures the arc of recent jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, as well 
as deeper constitutional logic. In an era in which equality norms dominate 
constitutional understandings, claims of disparate treatment—whether the exclusion 
of religious entities from government-controlled benefits, or the exemption of such 
entities from government regulation—demand justification. 
Lupu & Tuttle, Sites of Redemption, supra note 21, at 549 (citations omitted); cf. Jane 
Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment 
Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1059 (1996) (arguing that 
“placing equality at the pinnacle of constitutional values is the only way to assure that other 
important constitutional values,” including freedom of religion, “remain protected”). 
 23. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall “deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (“We are a ‘free people whose institutions are founded 
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but is also central to the focus on antidiscrimination norms in the 
modern evolution of such scattered areas of doctrine as the 
“dormant Commerce Clause”24 and intergovernmental tax 
immunity.25
The rest of this Article argues against this effort to subject 
religious institutional autonomy to the acid principle of “neutrality.” 
More broadly, it tries to articulate and describe a still-vigorous 
doctrine of religious institutional autonomy even in the shadow of a 
weakened doctrine of free exercise. 
In Part II of the Article, I argue that religious institutional 
autonomy, in its most full and vigorous form, is entirely consistent 
with Smith. Moreover, institutional autonomy is consistent with 
Smith not only in a narrow, technical sense, but also with respect to 
the bedrock principle for which Smith stands. In Part III, I briefly 
consider a related challenge from within institutional autonomy 
jurisprudence itself—that is, the idea of “neutral principles of law” 
upon the doctrine of equality.’” (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967))); Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause enforces the 
Constitution’s “commitment to the law’s neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake”). 
The precise meanings of “equality” and “neutrality,” and whether these abstract ideas 
have genuine meaning or are only placeholders for substantive rights, are issues that have been 
hotly debated among constitutional scholars and political theorists. For the debate in its most 
classic form, compare Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1982), with Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 273 (1983) 
(“Equality is a central theme in the native idiom of American culture. Lawyers and judges will 
go on using egalitarian rhetoric not merely to exploit the constitutional doctrine founded on 
the text of the equal protection clause but because they want to address live legal issues in the 
language that most naturally expresses the substantive values underlying their claims and 
decisions.”). I will touch on this puzzle again in Part V of this Article. 
 24. See generally City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978) 
(defining contemporary Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to allow state regulations that 
have incidental effects on interstate commerce as long as those regulations are evenhanded 
rather than protectionist); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) 
(noting the “distinction between the power of the State to shelter its people from menaces to 
their health or safety and from fraud, even when those dangers emanate from interstate 
commerce, and its lack of power to retard, burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for 
their economic advantage, is one deeply rooted in both our history and our law.”); Michael E. 
Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1986). 
 25. See generally Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594 (1992) (modern doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity emphasizes prohibition on discriminatory taxes); Davis v. 
Mich. Dep’t of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) (discussing the move from older cases that 
emphasized absolute state immunity against federal taxation to more recent jurisprudence that 
allows federal government broad taxing authority against states as long as such taxes are 
exacted equally from private persons upon the same subject matter); New York v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (same).  
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made famous in the Jones v. Wolf.26 decision. “Neutral principles of 
law” sounds suspiciously like Smith’s “neutral, generally applicable” 
language, but I argue that they have no necessary connection with 
each other. In Part IV, I briefly explore the boundary between the 
realm of institutional autonomy and the realm of free exercise by 
saying something about the hardest test case we now confront—the 
responsibility of churches for sexual abuse by clergy. Part V 
concludes by tying together some of the themes of the Article. It 
also suggests why the invocation of “neutrality” is both an 
understandable (and in some contexts, correct) impulse in 
discussions of religion and law, and yet a distracting snare. 
II. NEUTRAL LAWS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EXEMPTIONS 
Smith is inapplicable to the traditional doctrines of religious 
institutional autonomy because those doctrines are not 
jurisprudentially “anomalous” in the specific sense that concerned 
the Court in Smith.27  Subpart A explains why, regardless of whether 
or not there should be a constitutional right to religion-based 
exemptions (a right in which I happen to believe), the Court in 
Smith was at least correct that such a right would be “anomalous” in 
the constitutional order. Subpart B explains why religious 
institutional autonomy is not “anomalous” in Smith’s sense; it is, 
instead, to coin a phrase, entirely “omalous.” 
A. Why Exemptions Are Anomalous 
The beginning of wisdom here is to recognize that Smith is not 
really a case about neutral, generally applicable laws. To describe it 
that way is to look through the telescope from the wrong end. 
Rather, Smith deals, as did Reynolds, with the specific problem of 
religion-based exemptions. A claim to a religion-based exemption 
arises only when a specific religious belief conflicts with the demands 
 26. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
 27. My argument in this Part draws on a longer paper that I have been working on for 
some time. Perry Dane, Duty and Province, and the Rule of Law (working title, in progress). 
That paper tries to make sense of, and critique, both Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–1 to –4 (1994)), unconstitutional to the extent that it created a statutory 
right to religious-based exemptions from state laws), in the context of a larger discussion of 
legal pluralism and constitutional method. For present purposes, my aim is narrower—to say 
something about Smith and its implications for institutional autonomy. 
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of a particular, otherwise unobjectionable, secular law, and the 
religious believer seeks relief from that law. Moreover, Smith’s 
hostility to religion-based exemptions ultimately turns, not merely 
on a view of the Free Exercise Clause, but on a specific, essentially 
jurisprudential concern about the nature of all constitutional rights 
and constitutional adjudication. 
The Smith opinion specifically relied on the famous argument in 
Reynolds that to require religion-based exemptions would “be to 
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of 
the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto 
himself.”28 Smith characterized religion-based exemptions as a 
“private right to ignore generally applicable laws.”29 The Court then 
declared that the then-governing test for religion-based exemptions 
produced not a “constitutional norm” at all, but rather a 
“constitutional anomaly.”30 That last phrase—“constitutional 
anomaly”—is crucial. Justice Scalia’s claim is that a reading of the 
Free Exercise Clause that creates a general prima facie claim to 
religion-based exemptions is not merely wrong, as this or that 
application of either the Free Speech or Equal Protection Clause 
might be wrong, but that it is fundamentally outside the bounds of a 
well-ordered system of constitutional rights. And his contrast of 
norms and anomalies is not only alliterative,31 it confirms that, in 
Justice Scalia’s view, religion-based exemptions, by permitting “every 
citizen to become a law unto himself,” violate the rule of law itself. 
The bracing truth here, which those of us who support religion-
based exemptions deny at our peril, is that Scalia is at least half right. 
Religion-based exemptions are a “constitutional anomaly.” Justice 
Brennan in Sherbert, and for that matter Justice O’Connor in her 
own opinion in Smith, were just wrong when they tried to assimilate 
 28. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879)). 
 29. Id. at 886. 
 30. Id. The then governing test was the compelling-interest/balancing test of Sherbert. 
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 31. When I first read the Smith majority opinion, and admired its prose, if not its 
reasoning, I was particularly struck by the subtlety of Justice Scalia’s juxtaposition of “norm” 
and “anomaly,” assuming, as Scalia might have, that “anomalous” derived etymologically from 
the “negation of the Greek ‘nomos’ and the Latin ‘norma.’” ANTHONY J. STEINBOCK, HOME 
AND BEYOND: GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AFTER HUSSERL 132 (1995). Unfortunately, 
“anomalous” actually derives from the Greek prefix “an,” meaning “not,” and “homalos,” 
meaning “even,” “level,” or “smooth.” Id.; see also AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 75 (4th ed. 2000). Of course, even false etymology can be 
powerfully suggestive. 
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a right to religion-based exemptions to other categories of 
constitutional rights.32
Religion-based exemptions are constitutionally anomalous in 
several respects. For present purposes, I want to focus on two of the 
most fundamental. 
1. The nature of the claim 
The first of these anomalies regards the nature of the claim. In a 
typical challenge to the constitutionality of a law, the core argument 
is that there is something wrong with the law itself33—some 
discrepancy between the terms of the act and the terms of the 
Constitution.34 Moreover, the claim that a law is unconstitutionally 
defective must typically rest on some “objective” argument, by 
which I mean only that it cannot rest on a merely idiosyncratic 
objection.35 The Constitution establishes limits on the normative 
 32. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1963); Smith, 494 U.S. at 891–903 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 33. One account of the “basic structure” of constitutional law argues that 
“Constitutional rights are rights against rules. A constitutional right [only] protects the rights-
holder from a particular rule”; it does not grant the rights-holder the freedom to act in a 
particular way or to obtain a particular outcome. Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The 
Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (citations 
omitted). This formulation is narrower than the one I have in mind, but it does point in the 
same direction. 
 34. Chief Justice Marshall’s account in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803), still provides the paradigmatic image of judicial review: 
  So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the 
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case 
conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the 
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these 
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. 
  If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is 
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such 
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. 
Id. at 178. 
 35. In particular, I do not mean by “objective” anything as narrow as “true” or “clear” 
or “determinate” or “neutral.” Nor do I mean by “objective” anything like “textual” or 
“acontextual.” Ordinary constitutional analysis, for example, often does and should take social 
facts into account. Even subjective perceptions can factor into ordinary constitutional analysis, 
but only if they are, in the sense just outlined, “objectively” validated. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (“The Fourth Amendment does not protect all 
subjective expectations of privacy, but only those that society recognizes as ‘legitimate.’”); Bd. 
of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (conducting an Establishment Clause inquiry in 
terms of whether an “objective observer” would find that the government had “endorsed” 
religion). Thus, even in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which the 
Court (to much criticism) seemed to rely heavily on the empirical claim that segregation 
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authority of legislatures and other relevant actors. To say that an act 
is unconstitutional is to say that those limits have been transgressed. 
To put it another way, a finding that a law is unconstitutional 
typically assumes that the legislature could have, in principle, altered 
the law in some meaningful way36 so as to render it constitutional.37
This constitutional analysis is obvious when a law is challenged 
“on its face,” but it is no less true when a law is challenged “as 
applied.” A finding that a law is only unconstitutional “as applied” 
simply means that its defect only extends to certain sets of cases38 or 
produced “feeling[s] of inferiority” in black students, id. at 494, it is clear that the Court saw 
such stigma not as an idiosyncratic reaction, but as a social fact built into the system of de jure 
segregation. Brown has from the start been read to stand for a set of principles broader than 
any particular collection of psychological data. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., The 
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). 
 36. By use of the qualifier “meaningful,” I mean only to emphasize that I have in mind 
something more than a vacuous provision such as “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to 
abridge any rights guaranteed by the Constitution.” Cf., e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (2000); 16 
U.S.C. § 5206 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 112(d) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 248(d) (1) (2000). This is 
not to say that there is anything wrong with such provisions, or that they cannot be helpful to 
the analysis of a law. Cf. CISPES v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1985) (observing that 
though “such a provision cannot substantively operate to save an otherwise invalid statute,” it 
can “validate a [constitutional] construction of the statute”). 
 37. See Adler, supra note 33, at 3 (“To say that X’s treatment pursuant to a rule R 
violates X’s ‘constitutional rights,’ or that the treatment is ‘unconstitutional’. . . . entails [] that 
there exists moral reason to repeal or amend the rule R.”). 
I am making an analytic point here, not suggesting that a finding of unconstitutionality 
requires anything like “fault” or “intent.” In particular, my account of typical constitutional 
analysis does not rest on specific doctrines such as, say, the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to 
look to disparate racial impact as the basis for a claim that an otherwise “neutral” law is 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
The best arguments for disparate impact claims, after all, also argue that there is an 
“objective,” meaningfully avoidable, defect in a given practice or legal structure, or in a larger 
web of practices and structures, even if that defect is not apparent from the words of an official 
text or the provable conscious intent of official actors. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, 
Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 36 (1977); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Pamela S. Karlan, Note, 
Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE 
L.J. 111 (1983). 
 38. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (holding 
an amendment to the Communications Act regulating commercial telephone communications 
valid as applied to obscene speech but invalid as applied to indecent speech); Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 404 n.3 (1989) (striking down a Texas flag-burning statute as applied to 
persons engaging in political expression); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 
(1987) (suggesting that, at least outside the First Amendment context, a statute that is valid in 
some applications but not others can only be subject to as-applied, not facial, challenges). But 
cf. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 
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is only apparent in the light of certain empirical findings.39 But the 
defect is still “objective,” and the law could still, at least in principle, 
have been written in some meaningfully different way to avoid that 
defect. The same general point can be made when what is at stake is 
not the constitutionality of a law but some official act, such as a 
search or seizure. Ultimately, ordinary constitutional analysis requires 
some decision about whether the relevant actor has crossed an 
“objective” constitutional line. 
 
a. The counterexample of free speech. To see the principle of 
objectivity in relief, consider free speech doctrine. Freedom of 
expression is a notoriously complex problem. Some verbal 
expression, such as agreeing to commit a crime, is treated like 
ordinary conduct outside the scope of the freedom of speech.40 And 
some nonverbal expressive conduct—such as flag burning41 and 
certain forms of nude dancing42—though not literally speech, are in 
whole or in part protected as if they were.43 But though the question 
(1994) (arguing that a distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is misleading and 
unhelpful). 
 39. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (rejecting a facial Establishment 
Clause challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act, but remanding for a determination of 
whether, in practice, grants under the Act impermissibly flowed to “pervasively sectarian” 
institutions); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) 
(distinguishing between regulatory statutes that constitute “takings” of property on their face 
and those that can be proven to effect a “taking” only in the context of specific factual 
circumstances). 
 40. See generally Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); KENT 
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57–58, 80–85 (1989); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54 (1988). There is much room for debate in the 
categorical exclusion of particular categories of expression, such as obscenity, from the 
protection of free speech. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 
1. Moreover, the legal construction of the line between protected and unprotected verbal 
expression has been famously fluid. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
(clarifying the line between protected advocacy and unprotected incitement); N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (reinterpreting the constitutional status of defamation). My 
own purpose here is merely descriptive. 
 41. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989). 
 42. See Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
 43. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom 
of “Speech,” 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1525; Joshua Waldman, Note, Symbolic Speech and Social 
Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844 (1997). 
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of whether a particular species of nonverbal conduct should be 
treated as “speech” is always potentially in play, contemporary free 
speech doctrine ultimately grounds the answer in objective, if 
contingent and contextual, social fact and not merely in the 
subjective, idiosyncratic claims of individuals.44 A good deal of 
conduct will simply never be treated as protected by the Free Speech 
Clause. For example, “a physical assault is not by any stretch of the 
imagination expressive conduct protected by the First 
Amendment.”45 The reason is not that a physical assault could not in 
some sense be “expressive.” It is rather that this society’s robust, but 
nevertheless socially constructed, lexicon of genuinely 
communicative gestures includes the destruction of symbolically 
freighted objects (draft cards, flags, crosses, and so on), but not the 
physical invasion of human beings. 
The centrality of this objective social inquiry helps explain the 
typical shape that a certain genre of modern free speech litigation has 
taken: a series of questions about whether this or that behavior is, 
under one or another rubric,46 protected expression. For instance, 
can flag burning be a form of speech?47 Can sleeping in public parks 
Of course, deciding that a form of nonverbal conduct should share some or all of the 
protections of “speech” is only the beginning of the analysis. The question remains whether 
the government is impermissibly infringing on that “speech.” See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE 
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89–91 (1982). 
 44. See generally Waldman, supra note 43, at 1844 (positing that courts in symbolic-
speech cases investigate the “traditional social meaning” of the category of conduct at issue); 
Tiersma, supra note 43, at 1557–58 (arguing that nonverbal conduct can only be the 
functional equivalent of speech if it has meaning as a matter of either cultural convention or 
specific context). 
Some commentators have rejected this emphasis on conventional social meaning as 
unworkable, unnecessary, or incoherent. They disagree, however, on whether this should lead 
to more protection of certain forms of nonverbal conduct, see, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The 
Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29 (1973), or 
much less protection, see, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental 
Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1993). 
 45. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (citing Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)). 
 46. That is to say, the question is whether the behavior qualifies as “pure speech” or as 
“expressive conduct.” 
 47. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–06 (1989) (“That we have had little 
difficulty identifying an expressive element in conduct relating to flags should not be 
surprising. The very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country. . . . [In 
this case,] [t]he expressive, overtly political nature of [the defendant’s] conduct was both 
intentional and overwhelmingly apparent.”). 
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be a form of speech?48 Can begging be a form of speech?49 Can 
sitting, in itself, be a form of speech?50 Is wearing a mask a form of 
speech?51 Is a loosely organized ethnic parade a form of speech?52 
This is the stuff, not only of free speech analysis, but of ordinary 
constitutional analysis more generally. 
 
b. The distinct logic of exemptions. The point concerning the 
typical form of constitutional analysis is simple, even trivial. Even 
many constitutional claims arising under the Free Exercise Clause fall 
into this typical pattern.53 It is thus all the more remarkable that 
claims for religion-based exemptions—a distinct subset of free 
exercise claims—have a radically different analytic structure. 
Consider, for example, a person who reads the Biblical ban on 
graven images54 to bar the possession of photographs and, therefore, 
raises a free exercise claim against a rule requiring that she have a 
 48. Compare Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 592 (D.C. Cir. 
1983), rev’d on other grounds, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (“[T]here can be no doubt that the 
sleeping proposed by CCNV is carefully designed to, and in fact will, express the 
demonstrators’ message that homeless persons have nowhere else to go.”); id. at 622 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“I write separately . . . flatly to deny that sleeping is or can ever be speech for 
First Amendment purposes.”). 
 49. Compare, e.g., Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(“It cannot be gainsaid that begging implicates expressive conduct or communicative 
activity.”), with Young v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The 
only message that we are able to espy as common to all acts of begging is that beggars want to 
exact money from those whom they accost. While we acknowledge that passengers generally 
understand this generic message, we think it falls far outside the scope of protected speech 
under the First Amendment.”). 
 50. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. McConahy, 937 P.2d 1133, 1139 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) 
(noting that neither “[sitting and] reading a book with a lap full of leaflets,” nor “sitting 
with . . . friends eating pizza,” is a form of protected expressive conduct). 
 51. See generally Wayne R. Allen, Note, Klan, Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws 
and the First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819 (1991). 
 52. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995) (“Not many marches, then, are beyond the realm of expressive parades, and 
the South Boston celebration is not one of them.”), rev’g Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and 
Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1299 (Mass. 1994) (“parade 
was a civic, nonexpressive celebration”). 
 53. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(striking down a municipal ban on animal sacrifices); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) 
(striking down a state bar on clergy serving as delegates to the state constitutional convention). 
 54. “You shall not make for yourself a sculptured image.” Exodus 20:4. Jews and many 
Christians count this verse as part of the Second Commandment; Catholic and Lutheran 
tradition assigns it to the First Commandment. See THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY 
533–35 (W. Gunther Plaut ed., 1981); Steven Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 
15 CONST. COMMENT. 471, 474–76 (1998). 
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photo on her driver’s license.55 No reasonable “objective” analysis 
would suggest that there is anything “wrong” or defective with the 
photo license rule. Rather, the only problem with the statute is that 
it happens to conflict, by accident, with a particular religious norm. 
Thus, the religious objector’s precise legal claim is not that the rule is 
unconstitutional as such, either on its face or “as applied,” but only 
that she should be exempt from it. 
It might be said that what is “wrong” with the photo license rule 
is that it does not provide for religious exemptions. But that is an 
empty claim because it does not distinguish this rule from any other 
law.56 The fact is that any law that touches on individual conduct, 
however otherwise inoffensive or innocuous that law might be, could 
in principle come into accidental conflict with one or another 
religious norm. 
This indeed is precisely Justice Scalia’s point in the “parade of 
horribles” he trots out in Smith: 
The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of 
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic 
obligations of almost every conceivable kind—ranging from 
compulsory military service, to the payment of taxes, to health and 
safety regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, 
compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and traffic laws; to social 
welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws, 
animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws 
providing for equality of opportunity for the races.57
 55. See, e.g., Dennis v. Charnes, 805 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1984); Quaring v. Peterson, 
728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff’d by an equally divided court, 472 U.S. 478 (1985). 
 56. Many legal rules do provide for religion-based exemptions. I have before me as I 
write this the Pennsylvania driver’s license renewal form, which includes the following “special 
note”: 
When requesting a religious exemption, a letter must accompany this application. 
The letter must include: 
A. The request for the exemption; 
B. The name of the religious group to which the applicant is affiliated. 
C. A statement that the religion’s belief forbids the taking of photographs; 
and, 
D. The applicant’s signature. 
Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Form DL-143: Non-Commercial Driver’s License Application for 
Renewal, available at www.padmv.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). As Justice Scalia rightly 
points out in Smith, however, this does not, in itself, mean that other states are constitutionally 
required to provide such exemptions. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 
(1990). 
 57. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888–89 (citations omitted). 
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The point of this catalog, as Scalia emphasizes, is not to suggest that 
courts would grant exemptions in all these instances, but to say 
something about the open-ended, constitutionally anomalous, 
logical structure of a vigorous doctrine of religion-based 
exemptions.58 There simply is no litany of boundary questions in 
religion-based exemptions doctrine analogous to that in free speech 
doctrine, even though the range of behaviors for which free exercise 
protection has been sought is much wider. As the courts have long 
recognized, whether a behavior or practice is religiously significant 
must be left to religious judgment rather than “objective” social 
construction.59 Indeed, Scalia’s argument in Smith explicitly 
exploited the rejection of “objective” limits on which behaviors can 
count as religious. “[P]recisely because we value and protect . . . 
religious divergence,” he wrote, “we cannot afford the luxury of 
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, 
every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the 
highest order.”60 Scalia’s powerful charge, then, is that claims to 
religion-based exemptions, rather than defining general limits on the 
reach of law, simply demand a “private right to ignore” the law, and 
thus threaten the very idea of law.
2. The nature of the claimant 
This first anomaly of religion-based exemptions has as its 
corollary a further anomaly regarding who may invoke the right to 
an exemption. 
 58. Id. at 889 n.5.  
 59. The courts in the free exercise context have inquired, in “objective” terms, into 
whether a claimant’s motivation is “sincere” and is genuinely “religious.” See, e.g., Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). But both these inquiries go to the nature of a claimant’s 
motivation and not to the character of the conduct the claimant is seeking to protect. 
Therefore, neither alters my basic point that, while free exercise doctrine recognizes that any 
conduct could, in principle, have religious significance, free speech doctrine will only treat as 
“speech” what the rest of us are willing to consider as “speech.” 
 60. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. One might imagine a constitutional doctrine that took a 
more restricted view of what behavior could validly be deemed to have religious significance. 
And for that matter, as David Rabban’s historical study has demonstrated, one can imagine a 
free speech doctrine grounded less in the special protection of recognized modes of expression 
than in a more general libertarianism. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN 
YEARS 23–76 (1997). But while these possibilities should remind us that the distinction I have 
drawn between religion and speech in legal contemplation is contingent rather than essential, 
they do not undermine the force of the distinction in the present constitutional imagination. 
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Entitlement to the benefits of a particular constitutional 
protection sometimes depends on the existence of specific 
circumstances, but it rarely depends on the claimant’s specific 
ideological motivation. For example, a landowner does not have to 
love her land, or even believe in the institution of private property, 
to claim just compensation if the government takes the land by 
eminent domain. Nor does a parent have to claim a special 
attachment to the German language to invoke his substantive due 
process right to send his children to a school that teaches German.61 
In sum, typical constitutional analysis creates well-defined, but 
general, zones of liberty. 
Religion-based exemptions, however, are once again different. 
They do not establish general zones of liberty. And they do not 
recognize general rights. They are, after all, exemptions. Under 
Sherbet and RFRA, a “graven image” literalist would have a prima 
facie right to a driver’s license sans photo. But I, a Jew whose 
religious tradition is more relaxed on this question,62 would not have 
such a right, unless I lied and risked being found insincere. 
A doctrine of religion-based exemptions bears some resemblance 
to libertarianism.63 But it is a differential libertarianism, in which my 
liberties bear no necessary resemblance to his liberties or her liberties 
 61. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 62. I rely here on “the dominant position in Jewish law, as well as custom and practice, 
[which] permits the photographing of human beings.” Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 
1124 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Malkiel Zevi Halevi Tennenbaum, 3 RESPONSA DIVREI 
MALKI’EL § 58 (1897)). The Jewish legal corpus also includes a legitimate, “albeit minority, 
position [that] prohibits photographs of humans, especially of the face.” Id. 
 63. Cf. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 n.17 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“It is readily 
apparent that virtually every action that the Government takes, no matter how innocuous it 
might appear, is potentially susceptible to a Free Exercise objection. . . . Accordingly, if the 
dissent’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is to be taken seriously, then the 
Government will be unable to enforce any generally applicable rule unless it can satisfy a federal 
court that it has a ‘compelling government interest.’ While libertarians and anarchists will no 
doubt applaud this result, it is hard to imagine that this is what the Framers intended.”). 
Serious libertarians argue that, as a general matter quite apart from the problem of 
religious exemptions, only a narrow range of laws, limited to certain well-defined ends such as 
defending persons from violence, are presumptively legitimate. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 25–28 (1974). At the very least, a milder, constitutionally 
enforced libertarianism might require in a variety of contexts that the government bear the 
burden of demonstrating that a challenged law has a “proper” purpose and embodies a “close 
and substantial relationship” between that purpose and the means chosen to pursue it. Ravin v. 
State, 537 P.2d 494, 498, 504 (Alaska 1975) (striking down a law criminalizing the private use 
of marijuana). See generally Susan Orlansky & Jeffrey M. Feldman, Justice Rabinowitz and 
Personal Freedom: Evolving a Constitutional Framework, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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or your liberties.64 In the precise words of Reynolds that the Smith 
opinion invokes, religion-based exemptions, if taken seriously, seem 
to “allow every citizen to become a law unto himself.”65
B. Religious Institutional Autonomy: The Omalous Norm 
Whatever one thinks of Smith, or of religion-based exemptions,66 
however, the distinct set of doctrines we call religious institutional 
autonomy are not anomalous along precisely the same dimensions 
that religion-based exemptions are. Or, to engage in a bit of 
etymological back-formation, autonomy is “omalous.”67
Let me be clear here. Doctrines of religious institutional 
autonomy do suggest, to one degree or another, a special 
constitutional status for religion. They even often require that 
religious institutions be exempt from “neutral, generally applicable 
laws” that apply to other institutions. Nevertheless, that special status 
for religious institutions is, in significant ways, distinct from the 
doctrine of religion-based exemptions that was embraced by Sherbert 
and rejected by Smith. The difference is not that institutional 
autonomy doctrine covers institutions rather than individuals.68 It is, 
 64. For a defender of religion-based exemptions, this is a virtue rather than a vice. See, 
e.g., Dane, Constitutional Law and Religion, supra note 18, at 119 (“A general ‘right of 
conscience’ would radically revise, both jurisprudentially and substantively, the relationship 
between law and the individual. The free exercise clause, as limited to religious claims, does, to 
be sure, raise its own problems. But its narrow scope is what makes it more an island in a world 
of legal obligation than an overarching challenge to the notion of such obligation.”). 
 65. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (emphasis added); see also 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). 
 66. In the longer paper from which the above was just taken, I go on to suggest how 
religion-based exemptions, though they are constitutionally anomalous, nevertheless make 
normative and jurisprudential sense. My strategy involves invocations of legal pluralism, a 
discussion of the relation of constitutional law to the rest of the legal fabric, and certain fancy 
abstract claims about the place of stereoscopy and double-coding in legal argument and 
rhetoric. 
 67. For the etymology of “anomalous,” see supra note 31. My back-formation just 
eliminates the negative prefix. 
 68. Indeed, it bears emphasis that churches and other religious institutions can 
themselves seek Sherbert-type exemptions, and to that extent, I understand their claims as 
being outside the scope of my discussion of institutional autonomy. See, e.g., New Life Baptist 
Church Acad. v. Town of East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989) (religious school 
seeking conscientious exemption from local procedures designed to guarantee adequacy of the 
secular education that the school provided to its students); S. Ridge Baptist Church v. Indust. 
Comm’n of Ohio, 676 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (Church sought religion-based 
exemption from participating in or contributing to Ohio Workers’ Compensation scheme). 
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rather, that the special status provided by the distinct complex of 
doctrines referred to as religious institutional autonomy is both 
narrower and broader than that required by the doctrine of religion-
based exemptions at issue in Sherbert and Smith. And those 
differences render institutional autonomy, with respect to the 
jurisprudential issues that are at the heart of Smith, entirely routine. 
Institutional autonomy covers a variety of problems, ranging 
from classic church property disputes to more recently developing 
questions over the extent to which various regulatory regimes, 
including labor law,69 civil rights law,70 and even malpractice,71 
defamation,72 and contract73 law, should be permitted to intervene in 
 69. The leading case, though technically decided on statutory rather than constitutional 
grounds, was NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding that the 
NLRB did not have jurisdiction over a union organizing effort by parochial school teachers). 
But cf. Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 
1985) (upholding the constitutionality of applying a state labor law regime to a religious 
school); Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 
1992) (same). 
 70. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (enforcing 
“ministerial exception” to employment discrimination law); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of 
United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Williams v. Episcopal Diocese 
of Mass., 766 N.E.2d 820 (Mass. 2002) (same). 
 71. See, e.g., Cherepski v. Walker, 913 S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1996) (holding that there is no 
cause of action for clergy malpractice); Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 763 P.2d 948, 961 (Cal. 
1988) (rejecting a malpractice claim based on suicide allegedly arising out of religious 
counseling); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1993) (same); In re 
Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that parents 
could not bring suit for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress based on 
injuries due to a church’s effort to drive out demons from their daughter). But cf., Dausch v. 
Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994) (allowing a professional negligence claim by a 
parishioner against a pastor, but only for “secular” aspects of psychological counseling); 
Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2002) 
(allowing a negligence claim based on “neutral” legal principles). 
 72. See, e.g., Klagsbrun v. Va’ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732 
(D.N.J. 1999) (refusing to entertain a defamation claim based on communications alleging 
that the plaintiff was a bigamist according to Jewish law; holding that adjudication of the claim 
would require courts to inquire into religious doctrine and practice); Goodman v. Temple Shir 
Ami, Inc., 712 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Marks v. Estate of Hartgerink, 528 
N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1995) (recognizing a qualified privilege against a defamation claim for 
communications made in the context of church disciplinary proceeding). But see, e.g., 
Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conference of United Methodist Church, 663 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 2003) 
(distinguishing Marks when alleged defamation was published in a secular newspaper). 
 73. Compare, e.g., Jewish Center of Sussex County v. Whale, 397 A.2d 712 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div., 1978) (adjudicating the merits of a suit for rescission of contract between 
congregation and rabbi, holding that “arrangements between a pastor and his congregation are 
matters of contract subject to enforcement in the civil court”), and Sam v. Church of St. Mark, 
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the internal relations of religious institutions and communities. But 
these various categories still produce a discrete, distinct, and 
objective, even if difficult, set of rights and legal outcomes. 
Institutional autonomy doctrine, like other constitutional doctrines, 
provides the standard against which various legal regimes can be 
found objectively sufficient or defective. It also invites, and requires, 
exactly the same sort of boundary questions, and answers to those 
questions, that we find in free speech and other constitutional 
doctrines. In that important sense, the scope of religious institutional 
autonomy is narrower than that of a doctrine of religion-based 
exemptions. 
But institutional autonomy is also broader than a doctrine of 
exemptions in a way that takes it out from under Smith’s injunction. 
The right to institutional autonomy does not depend, as the right to 
religion-based exemptions does, on asserting a specific conflict 
between a secular legal norm and a sincerely held religious belief. To 
the contrary, the right to autonomy, correctly understood, attaches 
to a religious institution regardless of its motives and beliefs.74 
Consider, for example, the so-called ministerial exception, which 
immunizes decisions about the appointment of clergy from the reach 
of civil rights and other statutes.75 The ministerial exception ensures 
that a church would not have to appoint a woman pastor when 
doing so is contrary to its theology or doctrine. But it equally 
protects a church that, though it has no principled objection to 
741 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (upholding summary judgment for the defendant in 
a suit for wrongful termination of a priest), with Goodman, 712 So. 2d at 777 (dismissing a 
terminated rabbi’s claim for breach of contract, holding that “[i]nquiring into the adequacy of 
the religious reasoning behind the dismissal of a spiritual leader is not a proper task for a civil 
court,” though allowing a separate claim for payment on past executed contract). 
 74. Some cases do suggest otherwise. See, e.g., McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 851 
(N.J. 2002) (allowing suit for tort and breach of contract in which a former seminarian alleged 
that he had been driven from the seminary by acts of sexual harassment; holding that 
“[A]lthough the church autonomy doctrine provides a shield against excessive government 
incursion on internal church management, it . . . is implicated only in those situations where 
the alleged misconduct is rooted in religious belief” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). But they are best explained as instances of sloppy thinking. 
 75. See, e.g., Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 
2004); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. 
Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); cf., Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home 
of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying “ministerial exception” to 
claim for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act). 
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women clergy, is simply sexist.76 In both instances, the decision is 
outside the scope of secular legal interference. 
Admittedly, some parts of religious autonomy doctrine involve 
attention to particular religious beliefs. The polity inquiry in church 
property disputes, for example, requires distinguishing between 
hierarchal and congregational forms of religious governance.77 But 
the point of that distinction is to effectuate autonomy for both types 
of religious institutions, not to suggest that one is entitled to a 
constitutional privilege to which the other is not.78
In sum, an autonomy regime is not an exemptions regime, and 
Smith’s critique of exemptions simply does not touch on the 
question of autonomy. More specifically, Smith is simply not relevant 
 76. See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 
173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of minister’s sex discrimination suit, 
even though “resolution of the claim” would require “no evaluation or interpretation of 
religious doctrine”). As the court explained in Combs, “in investigating employment 
discrimination claims by ministers against their church, secular authorities would necessarily 
intrude into church governance in a manner that would be inherently coercive, even if the 
alleged discrimination were purely nondoctrinal.” Id.; see also, Young v. N. Ill. Conference of 
United Methodist Church, 818 F. Supp. 1206, 1210–11 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting a 
minister’s suit for race and sex discrimination, even though there were “no religious beliefs 
specifically at issue” in the case); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 
F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that church was under no obligation to offer a 
religious justification for its employment decision because the Free Exercise Clause “protects 
the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it. In these sensitive areas, the state may 
no more require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal 
content.”); cf Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 
1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting a minister’s age discrimination suit but remanding for further 
consideration of a claim of breach of contract). 
 77. As I will discuss infra Part III, Jones v. Wolf held that individual states may choose to 
resolve church property disputes by way of a “neutral principles of law” approach rather than 
the traditional “polity” approach. Even in such states, however, resort to a polity analysis 
remains constitutionally mandated under certain circumstances: 
[T]here may be cases where the deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution of 
the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the 
ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments of 
ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the 
court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative 
ecclesiastical body. 
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979). 
 78. Again, some scattered cases suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Callahan v. First 
Congregational Church of Haverhill, No. 01-2974H, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 641, at *12 
(Dec. 4, 2004) (“While civil courts must tread more cautiously in disciplinary matters 
concerning hierarchical churches, the same deference is not accorded to congregational 
churches.”), vacated and remanded by Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 
808 N.E.2d 301 (Mass. 2004). But this approach, again, is clearly mistaken. 
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to doctrines of religious institutional autonomy that (a) are discrete, 
defined, and predictable; and (b) apply to religious communities 
generally. 
Of course, none of this in itself constitutes a defense or 
justification of a vigorous doctrine of institutional autonomy. Such a 
defense is (mostly) beyond the scope of this Article.79 Nor does it 
deny that there is some connection between religious autonomy and 
religious exemptions. Those of us who defend exemptions on legal 
pluralist grounds will, in particular, see institutional autonomy—with 
its juridical and jurisdictional overtones—as emblematic of the larger 
encounter between religious and secular normative systems.80 We 
might even see institutional autonomy as the conceptual kernel 
around which a defense of exemptions might be built. But that 
argument does not operate in reverse: while autonomy might be one 
conceptual starting point for thinking about exemptions, rejecting 
exemptions, at least on the jurisprudential grounds highlighted in 
Smith, does not threaten the conceptual or doctrinal viability of 
autonomy. 
III. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF  
SELF-GOVERNANCE 
Religious institutional autonomy faces another purported 
challenge, however, in Jones v. Wolf..81 and its invocation of “neutral 
principles of law.” My argument in this Part of the Article is that, 
contrary to some lower court decisions, Jones’s language of “neutral 
principles of law” is not the equivalent of Smith’s “neutral, generally 
applicable laws.” Furthermore, Jones, though a problematic case in 
many respects, firmly stands not for an attack on religious 
institutional autonomy, but for the recognition that, in a complex 
world, there might be more than one way for a secular legal system 
to try to respect that autonomy. 
A. The Case (Read and Misread) 
Jones v. Wolf, handed down about eleven years before Smith, 
was—unlike Smith—squarely about the scope and character of 
 79. I will have something to say on this question in Part V of this Article, but part of 
what I will say is that only so much can be said. 
 80. Cf. Part V infra (discussing the “existential encounter” of religion and the state). 
 81. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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religious institutional autonomy. And the Court did hold in Jones 
that, in resolving church property disputes, state tribunals were not 
under all circumstances required to defer to the decisions of 
authoritative church tribunals, but that they could instead employ 
the so-called neutral principles of law approach, looking to the 
secular meaning of instruments such as deeds, trusts, articles of 
incorporation, and the like.82 Thus, read a certain way, Jones would 
seem to strip away the affirmative force of the principle of religious 
institutional autonomy83 and reduce autonomy to a merely negative 
injunction that civil courts may not entangle themselves in the 
interpretation and application of substantive religious doctrine.84 
 82. Id. at 602. 
 83. For discussions of the distinction between the affirmative and negative aspects of 
religious institutional autonomy, see Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, supra note 18, 
at 117; see also Perry Dane, The Corporation Sole and the Encounter of Law and Church, in 
SACRED COMPANIES: ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF 
ORGANIZATIONS 50 (Nicholas Jay Demerath III et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Dane, The 
Corporation Sole and the Encounter of Law and Church]. 
 84. See, e.g., Singh v. Singh, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1264 (2004) (affirming lower court 
judgment ordering membership of Sikh temple to hold an election for its board of directors); 
Weaver v. Wood, 2 Mass. L. Rep. 522 (Mass. 1994) (allowing suit by church members against 
church officials complaining about certain expenditures on media ventures, at least as to those 
counts in complaint that would not contain references to religious doctrine, polity, and 
practice); Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester, 625 N.E.2d 1352 (Mass. 1994) 
(finding jurisdiction in suit by parishioners complaining that Catholic bishop had improperly 
closed their church, yet holding for bishop on the merits); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, 
Toward a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925, 943 (2000) (“When 
read with Smith, the neutral principles exception of Jones seriously undercuts the protection 
from government intrusion that the church autonomy cases once afforded to religious groups. 
After all, when neutral legal principles suggest how a denominational dispute should be 
decided, the independence and autonomy of the church is irrelevant, and a court may proceed 
to resolve the dispute in accordance with such principles even if the resolution ignores or 
contradicts the result indicated by the church’s own governing structure.”); Scott C. Idelman, 
Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 
252–55 (2000). 
Some of the language in Jones v. Wolf could fairly be read to support this minimalist 
interpretation of the demands of religious institutional autonomy. See 443 U.S. at 602 (“The 
First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of 
religious doctrine and practice. As a corollary to this commandment, the Amendment requires 
that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest 
court of a hierarchical church organization. Subject to these limitations, however, the First 
Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a particular method of resolving church 
property disputes. Indeed, ‘a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church 
property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the 
ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.’ At least in general outline, we think the 
‘neutral principles of law’ approach is consistent with the foregoing constitutional principles.” 
(internal citations omitted)). As I will demonstrate, however, the Court’s actual defense of the 
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And, indeed, some courts have applied the “neutral principles of 
law” mantra in a range of situations to erode the organizational self-
governance and self-policing of religious communities. This is most 
apparent in some of the context of sexual abuse and related claims,85 
which I discuss in more detail in Part IV of this Article. But other 
instances appear in scattered state court decisions that have, for 
example, allowed parochial school teachers to unionize under state 
labor law,86 overridden a synagogue’s decision regarding the 
prerequisites for membership,87 and reached the merits of a suit by 
Catholic parishioners against a bishop’s decision to close their 
church.88 In that sense, Jones’s willingness to allow churches to be 
subject to neutral principles of law might seem to foreshadow 
Smith’s willingness to allow all religious folk to be subject to neutral, 
generally, applicable laws.89
neutral principles approach was not merely that it was minimally “consistent” with the 
prohibition on civil courts resolving issues of religious doctrine. Just as important, the Court 
emphasized that the “neutral principles” approach could potentially allow churches to express 
their affirmative will through secular instruments of private ordering, and also pointed out how 
the difficulties in the polity approach as an instrument for deference to the autonomous 
decisions of churches. 
 85. See, e.g., Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. 
Conn. 2003); G.B. v. Archdiocese of Portland, No. 01-1437-AS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7033 
(D. Or. Feb. 11, 2002); Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 77–80 (D.R.I. 1997); Moses v. 
Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993) (“Application of a secular standard to 
secular conduct that is tortious is not prohibited by the Constitution. . . . Because the facts of 
this case do not require interpreting or weighing church doctrine and neutral principles of law 
can be applied, the First Amendment is not a defense against [the plaintiff’s] claims.”); J.M. v. 
Minn. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. 2003) (allowing suit 
for negligent retention against a church because the “Establishment Clause is not implicated 
[in tort suits against churches] where neutral principles of law, developed and applied without 
particular regard to religious doctrines, establish the applicable standard of care”). 
 86. See South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus 
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 723 (N.J. 1997) (despite concerns that resort to 
neutral principles of law “ignores the church’s resulting loss of autonomy and avoids the 
required in-depth constitutional analysis[,] . . . we conclude that reliance on the doctrine of 
neutral principles will prove proper and efficacious”). 
 87. See Park Slope Jewish Ctr. v. Congregation B’nai Jacob, 686 N.E.2d 1330 (N.Y. 
1997) (remanding to enforce terms of prior stipulation between groups using the same 
synagogue building). 
 88. Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester, 625 N.E.2d 1352 (1994). 
 89. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 218 n.39 (asserting that “neutral principles” cases 
“undermined Watson by suggesting that the state’s adjudicators are not bound by the findings 
of religious lawfinders, and foreshadowed Smith by forcing the state’s terms upon religious 
law”). Consider also Professor Idelman’s argument: 
[T]he Supreme Court in recent years has consistently recalibrated its jurisprudential 
conception of “neutrality” essentially to mean equality-of-treatment between 
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B. The Complexity of Autonomy 
This sort of reading of Jones, as intimately tied to Smith, should 
be met skeptically if for no other reason than the radically different 
judicial line-ups in the two cases. The 5–4 decision in Jones was 
mostly a product of the so-called liberal wing of the Court,90 while 
the dissent was made up of more conservative justices.91 Those sides 
were reversed, of course, in Smith: three of the five justices who 
joined the Jones majority dissented in Smith,92 and Justice White, the 
only dissenting justice in Jones still on the Court when Smith was 
decided, joined that decision’s majority.93 Clearly, the ideological 
religion and nonreligion. Thus, according to this revised view, the Free Exercise 
Clause should generally not be read to require accommodation for religious 
practices where such accommodation would not be required or is not provided for 
nonreligious practices, while the Establishment Clause should generally not be read 
to prohibit support to religion (at a widely diffused level) where such support is also 
provided to nonreligion. . . . Superficially, at least, the “neutral” approach would 
now entail subjecting such defendants and their conduct to the same adjudicatory 
processes as their nonreligious counterparts, a prospect that has already been partly 
realized by the Court’s embrace of the “neutral principles of law” approach to 
resolving church property cases and, in turn, by the lower court utilization of that 
approach to resolve tort suits against religious defendants. 
Scott C. Idelman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 
75 IND. L.J. 219, 252 (2000); see also Farrell, supra note 8, at 126–27 (2003) (“In short, the 
neutral-principles analysis articulated in Jones appears to have expanded so that it permeates 
much of the Court’s religion-clause jurisprudence.”); see also, e.g., O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. at 
79 (explaining Smith’s “well-established principle that neutral laws of general application do 
not violate the First Amendment simply because they have the incidental effect of burdening a 
particular religious practice” by reference to language defending the “neutral principles of law” 
approach in Jones). For cases that simply mash together the “neutral principles of law” idea in 
the church autonomy cases with the “neutral, generally applicable laws” idea in Smith, see, for 
example, Sanders v. Baucum, 929 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Rashedi v. Gen. 
Bd. of Church of the Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Moses, 863 P.2d 310; 
Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002). 
 90. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court, which was joined by Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 595. For an effort to link 
Justice Blackmun’s opinion to “larger themes in Justice Blackmun’s civil liberties 
jurisprudence,” see Mark C. Rahdert, A Jurisprudence of Hope: Justice Blackmun and the 
Freedom of Religion, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 21–28 (1998).  
 91. Justice Powell wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Stewart and White. Jones, 443 U.S. at 610. 
 92. Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Smith, 494 
U.S. at 907. 
 93. Id. at 872. 
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wings of the Court thought that the stakes in the two cases were very 
different.94
The real problem with reading Jones as a precursor to Smith, 
however, is conceptual rather than biographical. Just as the emphasis 
on neutral, generally applicable laws in Smith must be read in the 
context of the specific jurisprudential challenges posed by religion-
based exemptions, the emphasis on neutral principles of law must be 
read in the context of certain theoretical and practical challenges in 
the understanding of religious institutional autonomy. Other than an 
unfortunate coincidence of language, the two ideas have little to do 
with each other and they therefore cannot simply be strung together 
to suggest an erosion of religious institutional autonomy. 
To understand the real import of Jones’s approval of neutral 
principles of law as one method for resolving certain intrachurch 
disputes, it will do well to consider that, as I have argued elsewhere, 
“religious autonomy . . . is a necessarily complicated and contested 
idea, much like other great values such as democracy or freedom.”95 
It is not only complex by virtue of the range of situations in which it 
arises, but more fundamentally, it is complex because there are many 
different, sometimes contradictory, ways one might understand and 
 94. See Rahdert, A Jurisprudence of Hope, supra note 90, at 28 (discussing Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in Jones in the context of his dissent in Smith). 
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens joined the majority in both Jones and Smith. Jones, 443 
U.S. at 596; Smith, 494 U.S. at 873. Justice Stevens, at least, might well have read the two 
cases as supporting a common conception of neutrality, which is that religion can, and perhaps 
must, be accorded no special deference. This would be consistent with the distinctive, arguably 
unique, position that Justice Stevens has staked out on the meaning of both religion clauses 
and their relationship with each other. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the 
Constitution, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1397, 1403–04 (2003) (noting that Justice Stevens comes 
closest, in both his Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, to taking the view 
that both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses should be interpreted in light of the 
distinct danger that religious communities pose of becoming “sovereign rivals to the state”); 
Lupu & Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, supra 
note 21, at 48–49 & n.48 (describing a “Secularist” position that is “attuned to the dark side 
of religion” and arguing that “Justice Stevens is relentlessly secularist. He routinely joins 
opinions that are receptive to Establishment Clause claims [and] . . . also routinely joins 
opinions that are hostile to Free Exercise Clause claims.”). It is no coincidence, after all, that 
Stevens was the only justice who, in City of Boerne, took the view that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act violated, not only separation of powers and federalism, but the Establishment 
Clause as well. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Steven, J., 
concurring). 
 95. Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, supra note 18, at 117; see also Dane, The 
Corporation Sole and the Encounter of Law and Church, supra note 83, at 50. 
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effectuate the goal of autonomy.96 One way to respect a juridical 
community’s autonomy, for example, is to give effect to that 
community’s substantive norms. From that perspective, the much-
maligned “departure from doctrine” approach, whose rejection is at 
the heart of American thinking on intrachurch conflicts, actually 
looks very good.97 Another way to respect a community’s autonomy, 
however, is to respect the community’s own processes of decision 
making. That goal would commend the so-called polity approach 
represented by Watson v. Jones and its progeny.98 Nevertheless, while 
the polity approach respects one sense of such decisional autonomy 
by deferring to the appropriate decisionmaking body of a religious 
community, it risks compromising a related sense of decisional 
autonomy by requiring a court to identify, sometimes in the face of 
severe conflict, where that locus of authority resides.99
 96. In The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, supra note 18, I identify the following 
general, sometimes overlapping and sometimes contradictory, categories of autonomy: 
Adjudicative Abstention, Substantive Interpretive Abstention, Jurisdictional Interpretive 
Abstention, Procedural Interpretive Abstention, Recognition, Substantive Deference, 
Decisional Deference, Constitutive Deference, and Dynamic Deference. I also discuss the 
possibilities of what I call Integrative Rejection, Non-Integrative Acceptance, and Integrative 
Acceptance as approaches—each in some way recognizing a form of autonomy—to the 
encounter of the secular and religious normative spheres. 
 97. See Denise G. Réaume, Common Law Constructions of Group Autonomy: A Case 
Study, 39 NOMOS 257 (1997). In Varieties of Religious Autonomy, supra note 18, I argued 
that the constitutionally mandated refusal of American courts to interpret the substantive 
doctrine of religious communities for themselves should be understood to arise “not only out 
of a commitment to religious autonomy—particularly when such abstention rules out 
effectuating competing forms of autonomy—but more particularly reflects other, undoubtedly 
important, values in the American principle of nonestablishment.” Id. at 146. 
 98.  See, e.g, Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 110–16 (1952); Watson 
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
 99. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979) (“[Under the ‘polity’ approach to 
church property disputes,] civil courts would always be required to examine the polity and 
administration of a church to determine which unit of government has ultimate control over 
church property. In some cases, this task would not prove to be difficult. But in others, the 
locus of control would be ambiguous, and ‘[a] careful examination of the constitutions of the 
general and local church, as well as other relevant documents, [would] be necessary to 
ascertain the form of governance adopted by the members of the religious association.’ In such 
cases, the suggested rule would appear to require ‘a searching and therefore impermissible 
inquiry into church polity.’” (citations omitted)); Nathan Clay Belzer, Deference in the Judicial 
Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes: The Lesser of Two Constitutional Evils, 11 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 109, 123 (1998) (“[I]n an effort to avoid making an independent inquiry into a church’s 
polity, courts often have no other means of ascertaining the locus of authority except to rely 
upon the ‘self-serving declarations of the national church.’ However, this reliance on the 
higher church’s self-characterization, deprives the local church of any genuine opportunity to 
prove that the church is, in fact, not hierarchical.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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On another axis of contested meaning, autonomy doctrine must 
necessarily be torn between, on the one hand, respecting a religious 
community’s right to bind itself through fixed, constitutive norms 
and, on the other hand, respecting that same community’s right to 
undergo revolutionary change. Or consider the tension between 
respecting the right of a religious community to exercise its authority 
over dissenters, which is central to any juridical enterprise, and the 
right of dissenters to separate themselves, which is equally central to 
the dynamics of religious history. 
My own view, as I have argued elsewhere, is that some of these 
tensions are simply intractable.100 Sometimes only one form of 
autonomy will genuinely be at stake. But not always. And in that 
event, no solution is ideal, even from the point of view of a fervent 
friend of religious autonomy. 
The neutral principles of law approach legitimated in Jones v. 
Wolf is best understood as one effort, for better or worse, at cutting 
through that intractability. It allows churches to resolve the meaning 
of autonomy for themselves through the instruments of secular 
private ordering. As the Court stated, 
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that 
it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to 
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. . . . 
Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar 
genius of private-law systems in general—flexibility in ordering 
private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the 
parties. . . . In this manner, a religious organization can ensure that 
a dispute over the ownership of church property will be resolved in 
accord with the desires of the members.101
Whether this solution, even as an option left open to individual 
states, makes sense as an expression of institutional autonomy 
doctrine is a good question.102 The answer is likely deeply contextual, 
 100. See Dane, The Corporation Sole and the Encounter of Law and Church, supra note 
83, at 50. 
 101. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603–04. One commentator, in trying to locate the Jones opinion 
in the wider context of Justice Blackmun’s jurisprudence, has argued specifically “that what 
gives the ‘neutral principles’ approach its constitutional ‘advantage,’ is that the . . . Court 
preserves the freedom of religious groups and individuals to . . . structure for themselves the 
fundamental character of their property relationship.” Rahdert, supra note 90, at 28. 
 102. For criticisms of the neutral principles approach from the point of view of defenders 
of religious institutional autonomy, see Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: 
Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 
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having to do with whether private ordering through instruments 
such as deeds and trusts can in particular instances effectively 
translate religious principles into enforceable secular norms.103 It also 
depends on whether enforcing religious disputes through even 
privately-ordered secular rules compromises what might be called the 
dignitary autonomy that comes when the secular state recognizes the 
norms of religious self-governance more directly. But these issues are 
beyond the scope of this Article. What should be clear is that the 
neutral principles approach only makes sense, if it ever does, in the 
context of an effort to effectuate a religious community’s effort to 
specify the form that the community’s autonomy should take 
through some type of private ordering.104 Indeed, seen in this light, 
1294–97 (1980); Belzer, supra note 99, at 123; Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the 
Constitutional Order: The End of Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1071 (1989); John 
E. Fennelly, Who is the Church?, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 319, 334 (1997) (arguing that the 
“imposition of secular philosophical and political concepts” such as majority rule “lurked 
below the seemingly benign notion of neutral principles”); John H. Mansfield, The Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 847, 
863–68 (1984) (arguing that the neutral principles approach, in requiring recourse to secular 
documents but disallowing judicial interpretation of religious language, imposes a unique 
disability on religious institutional autonomy). But cf., Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court 
Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 516 
(1990) (arguing that only the “neutral principles” approach can maintain equality among 
religious factions, and that without such “equality of treatment, courts risk establishing one 
religious faction at the expense of the free exercise rights of the other religious faction”). 
 103. See Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, supra note 18, at 117 (“I do not 
want to suggest here that something like the neutral principles approach is always an 
unsatisfactory response to intracongregational disputes. But for the approach to have any hope 
of advancing religious autonomy, in any of its multiple meanings, the formal instruments on 
which the approach depends must be understood, not as simple secular documents, but as 
imperfect and provisional efforts to facilitate and organize the encounter between the religious 
nomos and the secular state . . . .”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 106 n.33 (noting that “[i]n 
discussing how constitutional law relates to religious groups, some commentators seem not to 
have considered the possibility that groups are formed and maintained on noncontractual 
bases”); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Instiutions, 
55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 357 (1986) (“[The neutral principles test] is based on a hybrid 
organizational model . . . [that] assumes that the church has translated into familiar secular 
terminology its organizational characteristics, no matter how secular or alien they may be. The 
hybrid model fails to comport with reality, however, because it assumes that selectively culled 
provisions accurately reflect the expectations of the parties. It thus permits dispute resolution 
only by positing an artificial formalism on the church’s part.”). 
 104. As Rahdert has pointed out, Justice Blackmun, in his opinion for the Court in Jones 
v. Wolf, 
qualified his approval for the neutral principles approach by considering only its 
“broad outline[s],” and by stressing the “minimal burden” on religion that the 
approach, in the Court’s judgment, entailed. After Jones, it is still possible that some 
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the neutral principles approach emerges, not as the polar opposite of 
the polity approach, but as one of a complicated range of possible 
strategies, which also includes, for example, the special statutory 
schemes favored in some states105 for trying to mediate between the 
normative lexicons of church and state.106 To treat the neutral 
principles idea, as some courts have,107 as a sort of mini-Smith 
doctrine—to confuse neutral principles of law with Smith’s 
invocation of neutral, generally applicable law and, therefore, to 
employ it to reject claims of autonomy in the face of any secular and 
neutral regulatory regime—is just flat wrong. 
C. The Logic of “Neutrality” 
Indeed, to imagine otherwise would invite implications well 
beyond those probably contemplated by the courts and 
commentators that have invoked neutral principles so far. Consider, 
specific “neutral” principle might, as applied in a specific factual context, work a 
more substantial burden on religion that would provoke a more searching inquiry. 
In other words, under Jones’s reasoning neutrality is a necessary, but not by itself a 
sufficient, condition for constitutionality; the degree of burden on religious belief is 
also an important factor. This aspect of Jones comes into sharper focus when one 
considers Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 
where he rejected the Court’s view that neutral and generally applicable government 
regulations should be largely insulated from searching free exercise review. 
Rahdert, supra note 90, at 28 (footnotes omitted). 
 105. Some states, for example, have enacted lengthy religious corporation codes that 
detail, one by one, the governance structures of a variety of specific religious faiths. See, e.g., 
N.J. STAT. §§ 16:2-1 to 16:19-9; N.Y. RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS LAW §§ 40–455. See 
generally Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995 BYU L. 
REV. 439, 452 (listing and discussing statutory provisions); Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. 
Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1533–38 (1973) (same). 
Other states make do with more focused statutory provisions that try, through such devices as 
the “corporation sole,” to allow hierarchal religious groups to give secular form to their 
distinctive theology of ecclesiastical governance. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 10-11901 to 
10-11908; CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 10000–15; Montana Religious Corporation Sole Act, 
MONTANA CODE §§ 35-3-10-1 to 35-3-210. See generally Dane, The Corporation Sole and the 
Encounter of Law and Church, supra note 83; Gerstenblith, supra, at 454–61; James B. 
O’Hara, The Modern Corporation Sole, 93 DICK. L. REV. 23 (1988). These are, of course, only 
two of several templates for the statutory treatment of religious organizations. As discussed in 
note 108 infra, some state codes try, at least in some ways, to subsume religious corporations 
into their general law of nonprofit corporations. 
 106. See generally Dane, The Corporation Sole and the Encounter of Law and Church, 
supra note 83, at 50. 
 107. See, e.g., Sanders v. Baucum, 929 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Rashedi 
v. Gen. Bd. of Church of the Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349, 352–55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Malicki 
v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002); Ordenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 435–36 (Minn. 2002). 
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for example, the general rule that every nonprofit corporation be led 
by a board of directors of not less than three persons.108 In some 
states, as noted earlier, special statutory provisions cover the 
organizational structure of some or all religious entities.109 But in 
states in which the general three-director rule would apply, at least 
on its face, to churches along with other nonprofit entities,110 could 
such a requirement be enforced against, say, the Catholic Church? 
The realistic answer is probably no.111 But, to the extent that the 
neutral principles of law doctrine in Jones is read to allow states to 
defeat, and not merely facilitate, religious institutional autonomy, it 
would be hard to see exactly why. 
 108. For example, the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act provides that any 
nonprofit corporation “must have a board of directors,” MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION 
ACT § 8.01(a), and that “[a] board of directors must consist of three or more individuals, with 
the number specified in or fixed in accordance with the articles or bylaws,” id. § 8.03(a). This 
language appears, for example, in ARK. CODE § 4-33-803 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 617.0803 
(2004); MINN. STAT. § 317A.203 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. § 8.03 (2004). For similar 
requirements, see ALA. CODE § 10-3A-35 (2004). 
 109. See supra note 108 (discussing states with separate religious corporation codes, or 
with special statutory provisions providing for “corporations sole” or other forms of 
organization tailored to the needs of particular religious traditions.) 
 110. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, for example, unlike its predecessor, 
treats religious corporations as a category of nonprofit entity distinct from public benefit or 
mutual benefit corporations, and although it exempts religious corporations from certain 
requirements applicable to the others, it does not directly excuse churches from the rule in 
section 8.03(a), which specifies the minimum number of directors at three. To be sure, the 
Model Act provides in a general way that “[i]f religious doctrine governing the affairs of a 
religious corporation is inconsistent with the provisions of this act on the same subject, the 
religious doctrine shall control to the extent required by the constitution of the United States 
or the constitution of this state or both.” Id. § 1.80. But this provision is of no use unless the 
Constitution would indeed immunize a church from the reach of section 8.03 and other 
neutral rules of governance and administration. See generally Catherine M. Knight, Comment, 
Must God Regulate Religious Corporations? A Proposal for Reform of the Religious Corporation 
Provisions of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 42 EMORY L.J. 721 (1993) (arguing 
that the revised Model Act, though it is an improvement on earlier versions, still leaves 
churches with too little flexibility regarding their forms of governance). Perhaps for that 
reason, at least one state that adopted the text and approach of the Model Act has nevertheless 
added more generous disclaiming language to this provision. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-3-65 
(“Notwithstanding the foregoing, the board of directors of a religious corporation must 
consist of at least one (1) individual, with the number specified in or fixed in accordance with 
the articles or bylaws.”). 
 111. Cf. Crocker v. Stevens, 435 S.E.2d 690, 695 (Ga. App. 1993) (holding that GA. 
CODE ANN. § 14-5-43, which provides that the “majority of those who adhere to its 
organization and doctrines represent a church,” “properly is to be construed as being 
applicable only to churches having a congregational form of government” (quoting Jones v. 
Wolf, 260 S.E.2d 84, 85 (Ga. 1979) (on remand from United States Supreme Court))). 
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This problem is put in further relief if we consider that my 
hypothetical puzzle is not as far-fetched as it sounds. In the 
nineteenth century, the organizational form of many Catholic 
parishes included lay trustees who sometimes acted in opposition to 
the will of their diocesan bishops.112 This pattern of trustee 
governance reflected, in part, a larger movement among United 
States Catholics known as “Americanism.”113 It only receded due to 
a combination of theological assertiveness by Rome and certain 
American bishops and the creation of statutory or common law 
 112. Some analysts tie this phenomenon to the secular legal system’s anti-Catholic bias. 
Liam Seamus O’Melinn, for example, has argued that 
The Catholic experience of incorporation points to one of the peculiarities of 
American law in the first half of the nineteenth century: in many states Catholic 
Churches were allowed to incorporate, but only according to Protestant rules. 
  The law was tolerant and intolerant at the same time. . . . [In some states,] 
Catholic churches could incorporate but were subject to the trustee requirement. 
This requirement, which vested control of the church’s government in a group of 
laymen rather than in a member of the church hierarchy, was obviously antithetical 
to the governmental structure of the Catholic Church. 
  This discrimination was intentional, and it led to a longstanding conflict. 
Courts in Virginia, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts all expressed, at one 
time or another, hostility toward Catholicism. The result of this hostility was a 
lengthy battle between the church hierarchy and the state legislatures. On many 
occasions, there were also battles between trustees and their bishops. 
Liam Seamus O’Melinn, The Sanctity of Association: The Corporation and Individualism in 
American Law, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 101, 139–40 (2000) (citations omitted). 
In fact, the story is more complicated, in that the so-called trustee system was as much 
the product of an internal dynamic among American Catholics as of external prejudice. Under 
the trustee system, 
The clergy worked for the board and were subject to the trustees’ wishes. The 
trustees hired them, and they could also fire them. . . . One of the most popular 
slogans of the day was “the voice of the people is the voice of God.” Catholic 
trustees appropriated this maxim and applied it to the church. 
JAY DOLAN, IN SEARCH OF AN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM, A HISTORY OF RELIGION AND 
CULTURE IN TENSION 31–33 (2002) [hereinafter DOLAN, IN SEARCH OF AN AMERICAN 
CATHOLICISM]. See generally PATRICK W. CAREY, PEOPLE, PRIESTS, AND PRELATES: 
ECCLESIASTICAL DEMOCRACY AND THE TENSIONS OF TRUSTEEISM (1987); JAY P. DOLAN, 
THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT (1985); THOMAS T. MCAVOY, A HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1969). See also Dane, The Corporation Sole and the Encounter of Law and 
Church, supra note 83, at 50.  
 113. See generally PATRICK W. CAREY, AMERICAN CATHOLIC RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 
(1987); CAREY, supra note 112; David O’Brien, Americanism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORY 97 (Michael Glazier & Thomas Shelley eds. 1997); Thomas 
Wangler, Americanist Beliefs and Papal Orthodoxy: 1884–1899, in 11 U. S. CATHOLIC 
HISTORIAN 37 (1993). See also DOLAN, SEARCH OF AN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM, supra note 
112. 
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vehicles through which the church could manifest a more hierarchal, 
single-leader vision of diocesan authority. This nineteenth century 
intra-Catholic debate over church governance, however, continues to 
resonate114 in contemporary struggles concerning whether American 
Catholicism needs to take on a more democratic and distinctively 
American form.115 It is even possible to imagine a serious argument 
that the secular law, by enshrining and enforcing the authority of 
bishops in Catholic governance, is intrusively weighing in on one 
side of an internal Catholic debate about theology and ecclesiology 
and stifling what might otherwise be organic developments toward 
new notions of governance and authority. To that extent, at least, 
the question of whether to apply something like a three-member 
board requirement might begin to look like one of those intractable 
problems discussed above.116 But it is one thing to say that a problem 
is difficult, or that the meaning of autonomy might be complicated 
and contested, or that different aspects of autonomy might be in 
unresolvable tension with each other. But it is quite another thing to 
say that the state could or should impose its own neutral rules and 
values without regard to any genuine conception of religious 
autonomy at all. 
 114. See, e.g., Pete Hamill, Past Offers Cure for Church Ills, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 13, 
2002 (“The people in the Sunday morning pews support the local church with their 
contributions, but because the financial workings of the church are secret—here and in the 
Vatican—they get no accounting of the funds. . . . Much of that could be changed by going 
back to the future. . . . The quickest way to reestablish minimal trust might be to revive the 
notion of boards of trustees. . . . The trustees, in short, would have the last say on nonspiritual 
matters, from bank loans to legal expenses. They would be responsible for hiring and firing 
priests, and researching their histories. They would be the point of the spear aimed at corrupt 
priests. . . . Eventually, they could even demand from Rome the right to veto the Vatican’s 
choices of bishops.”); Raymond Schroth, 19th-Century Lessons in Lay Governance, NAT’L 
CATHOLIC REP., Nov. 1, 2002 (“If lay trustees had owned the churches and controlled the 
finances of the parishes in Boston, Los Angeles, New York and Milwaukee, would an offending 
priest have been shifted under a cloud of secrecy from one set of victims to another? Would 
hush money have been slipped to a blackmailer?”). 
 115. For recent efforts to articulate a more democratic and lay-centered vision of 
American Catholicism, see DAVID GIBSON, THE COMING CATHOLIC CHURCH: HOW THE 
FAITHFUL ARE SHAPING A NEW AMERICAN CATHOLICISM (2003); PAUL LAKELAND, THE 
LIBERATION OF THE LAITY: IN SEARCH OF AN ACCOUNTABLE CHURCH (2003); PETER 
STEINFELS, A PEOPLE ADRIFT: THE CRISIS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AMERICA 
(2003).  
 116. For a similar argument, see Dane, The Corporation Sole and the Encounter of Law 
and Church, supra note 83, at 50. 
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IV. THE BOUNDARIES OF AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
NEUTRALITY 
I have argued that neither Smith nor Jones stands for a larger, 
unqualified principle of neutrality under which the secular law can 
treat the religious realm just as it treats any other domain. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Smith did radically cut back on 
the protections afforded by the Free Exercise Clause.117 So the 
question remains where to draw the boundary between a truncated, 
crabbed right of free exercise and a vigorous, deferential, rich 
principle of religious institutional autonomy. 
The answer, I suspect, will again be deeply contextual. The 
considerations present in the church property context might well be 
different, for example, from those present in the ministerial 
exception context. Without trying to canvass the entire landscape, 
however, I do want to touch briefly on one specific problem: church 
liability for sexual crimes committed, particularly against children, by 
clergy. In this context, and those like it, the arguments for secular 
legal intervention—over and above enforcing private ordering—and 
the imperative of institutional self-definition seem most acute. 
A. The Dilemma Defined 
A free exercise analysis of a state’s response to the primary act of 
sexual abuse by a member of the clergy is in itself quite 
straightforward. Even a supporter of a broad regime of religion-
based exemptions would be reluctant to extend immunity from 
ordinary criminal or tort liability to a perpetrator of unambiguous118 
sexual abuse against children.119 To begin with, no proper claim for a 
 117. I leave for another occasion any consideration of the openings left in Smith for 
exemption claims in “hybrid cases” and in contexts involving “individualized government 
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.” Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
882, 884 (1990). 
 118. Arguably more complicated issues arise when more ambiguous forms of “touching,” 
allegedly in the service of pastoral or counseling relationships, are alleged to have crossed the 
line of legality. See, e.g., Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996). 
 119. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409 
(2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, more complicated questions arise in the context of ostensibly 
consensual sexual relationships between clergy and adults. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 
863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993); Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2002); Amato v. Greenquist, 
679 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997); 
Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 271 A.D.2d 494 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); Hawkins v. 
Trinity Baptist Church, 30 S.W.3d 446, 453 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); cf. Janice D. Villiers, 
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Sherbert-type exemption could even arise unless the sexual abuse 
were carried out in fulfillment of a putative religious norm, and, at 
least for clergy from mainstream churches, that argument tends not 
to arise.120 Moreover, if a specific religious defense were raised, even 
the staunchest defenders of free exercise would still probably reject 
it, either by applying the compelling-state-interest test121 or through 
some more categorical test,122 or just on the same sort of notion of 
Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 120. See, e.g., Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (“It may also 
be noted in passing that, although defendants persistently assert First Amendment protection, 
none makes any suggestion that the alleged sexual misconduct of defendant Trane [in sexually 
molesting a minor] is a part of the tenets or practices of the Roman Catholic Church . . . .”); 
cf. F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1997) (various church officials testified that 
Episcopal Church teachings did not sanction sexual relationship between a married rector and 
an unmarried parishioner); Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395, 398 (N.C. App. 1998). 
Indeed, the profound contradiction between the sexual misconduct of a member of the 
clergy and the professed tenets of his church has routinely been the basis for dismissing simple 
vicarious liability claims against those churches, thus requiring plaintiffs to pursue causes of 
action for negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and the like. See, e.g., Tichenor v. Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of New Orleans, 32 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1994); Taylor v. Beth Eden 
Baptist Church, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Wilson v. Diocese of N.Y. of the 
Episcopal Church, No. 96 Civ. 2400, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2051 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1998); 
Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 71 (D. Conn. 1995); Sanders v. 
Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169, 1179 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Juarez v. Boy Scouts 
of Am., Inc., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church, 
243 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Sparano v. Daughters of Wisdom, No. 
X08CV030199399, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1808 (July 1, 2004); Alpharetta First United 
Methodist Church v. Stewart, 472 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Konkle v. Henson, 672 
N.E.2d 450 (Ct. App. Ind. 1996); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); 
N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 599 & n.30 (Okla. 1999). But see, e.g., 
Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Church, 309 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D. Conn. 2004) (refusing to 
dismiss a vicarious liability count when abuse took place in the context of counseling); Enderle 
v. Trautman, No. A3-01-22, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20181 (D.N.D. Dec. 3, 2001) (refusing 
to grant summary judgment on vicarious liability issue); Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 
791 P.2d 344, 348 (Alaska 1990). 
 121. The classic cases, specifically approved in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, concerning the 
state’s compelling interest in protecting children from physical harm are Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding the application of a child labor statute), and 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination). Cf. New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a state’s compelling interest in protecting children as 
against free speech claim). 
 122. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1144–45 (1990) (arguing that when a “putative injury is internal to 
the religious community, the government generally [should have] no power to intervene, with 
the narrow exception of injury to children”); cf. Perry Dane, Note, Religious Exemptions Under 
the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1989) 
(suggesting a third-party injury test in free exercise cases). 
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humanitarian intervention that sometimes counsels even political 
sovereigns to interfere in each other’s affairs.123
It is also possible to imagine an entire company of clergy that is 
one large criminal conspiracy to engage in or abet the sexual abuse of 
children.124 In that eventuality, what is true of the state’s authority to 
deal with an individual perpetrator should also be true for its 
authority to deal with the group.125
Most lawsuits against churches arising out of clergy sexual abuse 
are not so straightforward, however.126 Rather than alleging direct 
 123. See generally HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL 
DILEMMAS (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES (Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2003); 
FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND 
MORALITY 177–78 (2d ed. 1997); NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2000). The force of this 
analogy is that it emphasizes that even when intrusion into the religious nomos is justified it 
remains problematic and comes at a cost to important principles of sovereign self-
determination. 
 124. Definitions of conspiracy vary. But both criminal and civil conspiracy generally 
requires something like an agreement by two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful 
purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means. See, e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 
770, 777 (1975); Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 
F.3d 406, 414 (3d Cir. 2003); State v. Ball, 661 A.2d 251, 269 (N.J. 1995); MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 5.03(1) (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a). Similarly, criminal or 
civil “aiding and abetting” liability requires, at least, both knowledge of the underlying offense 
and substantial assistance in the commission of that violation. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 
148 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 1998); SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996); 
People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278, 282 (Cal. 2000); Heick v. Bacon, 561 N.W.2d 45, 51–52 
(Iowa 1997); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
876(b) (1979). 
As relevant to suits against churches or church officials for sexual abuse committed by 
clergy, a successful allegation of conspiracy, or aiding and abetting, would have to show that 
the officials “shared in the criminal intent” of the actual abuser. See Ryan v. Roman Catholic 
Bishop of Providence, No. PC95-6524, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 104, at *13–14 (Aug. 26, 
2003). 
 125. I put to one side the difficult questions relating to the character and proper reach of 
nonconsummate or inchoate offenses such as conspiracy. See generally United States v. Recio, 
537 U.S. 270 (2003); Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate 
Offenses, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 151 (1995); Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of 
Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1973); Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to 
Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL OF 
RIGHTS J. 1 (1992); Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in 
Practice, 65 GEO. L.J. 925 (1977). 
 126. Some plaintiffs have alleged that church officials aided and abetted the actual 
perpetrators, or conspired with them prior to the acts of sexual abuse, for the purpose of 
committing the abuse. These tend to be boilerplate allegations, however, without factual 
support. See, e.g., Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 202 n.6 (1st Cir. 1999); Gibson v. 
Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Mo. 1997); Ryan, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 104, at *23; cf. See 
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involvement or aiding and abetting, they tend to arise as causes of 
action against the institution for negligent hiring, negligent 
supervision, vicarious liability, and the like. Many courts have 
dismissed such suits as unduly interfering in the core autonomy of 
religious groups to select and direct their clergy.127 Others courts, 
however, have been more open to these causes of action, at least 
when they can be pursued by way of so-called neutral principles of 
law.128
The issue of institutional liability arising out of clergy abuse is 
difficult precisely because, as noted, the state has a legitimate right to 
deter, punish, and award compensation for sexual abuse, and 
v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV 930300948S, 1997 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 2098, at *37 (July 31, 1997) (dismissing a civil conspiracy claim on the basis of the 
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, since defendant church officials allegedly conspired with 
each other, but not with the perpetrator priest). 
More plausibly, plaintiffs have alleged, particularly as a basis for demonstrating a 
continuing tort and thus avoiding a statute of limitations, that church officials engaged in a 
conspiracy to cover up sexual abuse or protect perpetrators. Courts have pointed out, however, 
the lack of a causal link between the alleged after-the-fact conspiracy and the sexual abuse 
itself. See, e.g., Kelly, 187 F.3d at 203; Ryan, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 104, at *15–16. 
 127. See, e.g., Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (D. Colo. 1998), aff’d on other 
grounds, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 
S.W.2d 92, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 
(Wis. 1995) (alternative ground of decision; primary holding rested on statute of limitations); 
Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 03-1416, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 616 (July 30, 
2004); cf. L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997) (adult victim). 
 128. See, e.g., Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. 
Conn. 2003); Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 76–77 (D.R.I. 1997); Rosado v. 
Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967 (Conn. Supp. 1998); Malicki v. 
Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); 
J.M. v. Minn. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2003); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Kenneth R. v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); see also, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of 
Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993) (adult victim); Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395, 398 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (same). 
Some courts have split the difference in various ways, allowing certain causes of action 
but not others. See, e.g., J.M., 658 N.W.2d at 594, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (disallowing 
cause of action for negligent hiring of pastor, because it would “force the court into an 
examination of church doctrine governing who is qualified to be a pastor,” but allowing cause 
of action for negligent retention, since the “standard used to determine negligent retention is 
based on neutral principles of law”); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997) (holding 
that the First Amendment barred causes of action for negligent hiring, ordination, and 
retention of, as well as failure to supervise, perpetrator priest, but allowing cause of action for 
intentional failure to supervise). 
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because, in principle, institutions, no more than individuals, do not 
enjoy blanket immunity from the state’s reach.129 On the other hand, 
it does seem odd to empower secular criminal and civil courts to tell 
churches who to hire and when to fire.130 The challenge is where and 
how to draw the line. 
 129. Again, I put to one side here the complex, general questions on the relation 
between individual and institutional responsibility. See generally MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, 
PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986); KIP 
SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS (1990); Susan Wolf, The Legal and 
Moral Responsibility of Organizations, in NOMOS XXVII CRIMINAL JUSTICE 267 (J.R. 
Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1985); Rosa Eckstein, Comment, Towards a Communitarian 
Theory of Responsibility: Bearing the Burden for the Unintended, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 843 
(1991). See also Part IV.B infra (discussing accounts of vicarious liability). 
 130. As one of my colleagues reminded me on reading a draft of this Article, the tort 
system would not literally tell a church who to hire and when to fire. To the contrary, my 
colleague insisted, “a finding of tort liability only shifts a loss from one party to another. It 
imposes a cost on the defendants, a cost that may be covered to some extent by insurance, but 
whether the defendants are willing to continue engaging in activity that runs the risk of those 
costs is left to them.” 
This view certainly has support in current thinking about the nature of the law of torts. 
See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (describing liability 
rules in tort, as distinguished from rules of property law or criminal law, as allowing but 
regulating the involuntary transfer or destruction of a legal entitlement); cf. Cippolone v. 
Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 536 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & dissenting in 
part) (“[In the context of an argument over federal preemption of state tort remedies,] the 
question whether common-law damages actions exert a regulatory effect . . . is . . . 
complicated. . . . The effect of tort law on a manufacturer’s behavior is necessarily indirect. 
Although an award of damages by its very nature attaches additional consequences to the 
manufacturer’s continued unlawful conduct, no particular course of action . . . is required.”). I 
find little comfort in this observation, however. 
To begin with, one need not entirely reject the insights of legal realism or economic 
analysis to believe that tort law, though it operates through the medium of financial 
compensation, can also at some level be an arena for the articulation and enforcement of 
behavioral norms. See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 
95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1358 (1986) (suggesting that liability rules can, depending on the context, 
either legitimate forced transfers or enforce rights-based entitlements, and arguing that the 
“claim that liability rules invariably constitute forms of legitimate transfer is ludicrous”); 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 
67 (1998) (emphasizing that courts in a tort suit “must say something about what category of 
conduct by one person affecting another is from now on to be considered enjoined by law, not 
simply about what fact patterns will now lead a court to provide a remedy”). Indeed, it would 
not take a full-blown corrective justice account of all of tort law, see, e.g., ERNEST L. WEINRIB, 
THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995), to observe that, at least with respect to the sorts of torts at 
issue in the sexual abuse arena, serious normative regulation of underlying behavior is being 
attempted, cf. Guido Calabresi, The Simple Virtues of the Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2201, 2205 
(1997) (“The nature of the entitlement depends on the circumstances. . . . [When, for 
example] does society say you must pay Y plus Z, but you must also suffer stigma, because 
society doesn’t really want you to take my entitlement? . . . These [and others] are the 
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B. The Logic of Duties 
The first step to digging our way out of this dilemma is to 
understand that the issues raised in most of these church liability 
cases implicate an important and difficult puzzle in tort law 
generally: the liability of parties for failing to do enough to prevent 
the torts or crimes of others. Indeed, the two sets of puzzles (those 
arising out of consideration of the proper legal relation between 
religion and the state, and those arising out of tort law and theory) 
are strikingly intertwined and best considered in tandem.131
The traditional black-letter tort rule is that, absent special 
considerations, parties are indeed not liable for failing to prevent the 
misdeeds of another.132 No general duty exists “so to control the 
questions that are ultimately worth asking. And that is why I find the abstract discussion of 
when property rules are better than liability rules not all that helpful.”). 
Second, even the view that liability rules merely regulate the terms of involuntary but 
legitimate transfers does not take normativity out of the equation, since such a liability rule 
presupposes an initial entitlement recognizing in plaintiffs a right to a state of affairs for whose 
loss defendant churches must compensate them. See Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal 
Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001) 
(emphasizing the conceptual and practical independence of the choice of initial entitlement, 
which is bound up in considerations such as equity, and the choice among various types of 
rules to effectuate that entitlement); Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the 
Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. L. J. 585, 593 (2003) (“Economic analysis cannot determine 
[which party] . . . should hold the initial entitlement. Instead, normative justification 
determines initial entitlements, which then determine the categories of buyer (injurer) and 
seller (victim) for purposes of economic analysis.” (citations omitted)). 
Third, even if tort law did not rest on and express any normative judgments, it would 
still impose financial consequences on certain conduct and, thereby, put defendants to the 
choice of facing those consequences or changing their conduct. And if any of the broad 
principles of Sherbert does survive Smith, it is the insistence that “[g]overnmental imposition of 
such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as” more direct 
regulation. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. 
Finally, to the extent that the imposition of tort liability on churches is based on 
something other than normative judgment, such as a purely distributional notion of insurance 
or cost-spreading, that in itself, for reasons I discuss infra at notes 172–74, should be a reason 
to be wary of it. 
 131. As noted earlier, supra note 17, I have argued elsewhere for the centrality of 
nonconstitutional or subconstitutional issues to a full understanding of the problems of 
religion and law. See Perry Dane, Constitutional Law and Religion, supra note 18 at 113; Perry 
Dane, supra note 17, at 21. 
 132. See, e.g., James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 694 (6th Cir. 2002); Moye v. 
A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. 1986); C.J.W. v. State, 853 P.2d 4, 
10 (Kan. 1993); Greater Houston Trans. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990); 
cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (limiting 
governmental duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect persons from private 
violence). See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 322 (2001); 3 FOWLER V. 
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conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical 
harm to another.”133 This principle is part of a larger constellation of 
liability-limiting ideas in traditional tort law and theory that also 
includes, for example, the more well-known rejection of a general 
duty to rescue.134 It builds on, and exemplifies, the deep, if 
controversial, notion that actors do not owe a duty to “the world at 
large.”135
Even absent a general duty, however, traditional tort law does 
recognize that distinct duties of protection can arise under certain 
circumstances. In particular, the existence of certain “special 
relationships” can justify liability for a failure to prevent harm by 
another.136 For example, an employment relationship, involving 
control and supervision by the defendant over the actual perpetrator, 
can trigger a duty of care in exercising such control and 
supervision.137 Similarly, a distinct fiduciary or equivalent relation of 
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.7, at 738 (1986). Classic older treatments of the 
topic include Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty To Control the Conduct of 
Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934). 
 133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315. As I discuss infra, and as detailed in this 
same Restatement section and elsewhere, the general principle is subject to various important 
qualifications. See infra Part IV-B-2. 
 134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (concluding that a party “realizes or 
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of 
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action”). 
 135. See, e.g., Sage v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 851, 867 (E.D. Va. 1997) (applying 
Virginia law in case under the Federal Tort Claims Act to reject federal liability for the 
Military’s and VA Hospital’s failure to control conduct of a schizophrenic on-duty officer so as 
to prevent him from indiscriminately gunning down four pedestrians in Philadelphia); 
Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947, 951 (Md. 1999) (dismissing a suit against a gun 
dealer for negligently allowing a gun on display to be stolen and used in a crime; holding that 
“One cannot be expected to owe a duty to the world at large to protect it against the actions 
of third parties, which is why the common law distinguishes different types of relationships 
when determining if a duty exists”). For the origin of the phrase, however, see infra note 171. 
 136. Thus, the full text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315, already quoted in 
part, reads that: 
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from 
causing physical harm to another unless 
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a 
duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or 
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other 
a right to protection. 
 137. See, e.g., Regions Bank & Trust v. Stone County Skilled Nursing Facility, Inc., 49 
S.W.3d 107, 115 (Ark. 2001) (holding that in a suit against a nursing home for negligently 
supervising a nursing assistant who sexually abused a comatose patient, the employer has duty 
to protect third-parties from foreseeable risks that employees pose to third parties); Marquay v. 
Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 281 (N.H. 1995) (“[A] school district or school administrative unit . . . 
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trust between the defendant and the plaintiff can trigger a special 
duty to protect the plaintiff from harm.138
1. The problem with special duties 
This analytic structure of traditional tort law—the rejection of 
any general duty to protect against the wrongdoing of third parties, 
qualified by the possibility of such a duty in the context of certain 
“special relationships”—explains the form of the causes of action in 
typical suits against churches for abuse by their clergy: negligent 
retention, negligent supervision, breach of fiduciary duty, and the 
like. It also explains why some of those cases involve specific inquiries 
has a duty not to hire or retain employees that it knows or should know have a propensity for 
sexually abusing students.”). 
According to the Restatement of Torts, 
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while 
acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally 
harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of 
bodily harm to them, if 
(a) the servant 
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the 
servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or 
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and 
(b) the master 
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his 
servant, and 
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising 
such control. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317. As this language makes clear, this duty to control 
is most germane when an employee’s acts are outside the “scope of employment,” so as to 
exclude vicarious liability on the employer’s part, but are nevertheless “closely enough 
connected with the employment in time and space to give the master a special opportunity to 
control the servant’s conduct.” 3 HARPER ET AL., supra, note 131, § 18.7, at 738. 
 138. See, e.g., Schneider v. Plymouth State Coll., 744 A.2d 101, 105 (N.H. 1999) (“In 
the context of sexual harassment by faculty members, the relationship between a post-
secondary institution and its students is a fiduciary one.”); Douglass v. Salem Cmty. Hosp., 
794 N.E.2d 107, 120 (Ohio 2003); see also Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420, 
426–27 (Wash. 1997) (“A group home for developmentally disabled persons has a duty to 
protect residents from [sexual] predators regardless of whether those predators are strangers, 
visitors, other residents, or employees. . . . The duty to protect another person from the 
intentional or criminal actions of third parties arises where one party is entrusted with the well 
being of another. Given [plaintiff’s] total inability to take care of herself, Elmview was 
responsible for every aspect of her well being. This responsibility gives rise to a [qualified] duty 
to protect . . . vulnerable residents from a universe of possible harms.” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. A (listing four 
specific “special relations” giving rise to a duty to protect, including the relation of a common 
carrier to its passengers and an inn to its guests, but expressing “no opinion as to whether 
there may not be other relations which impose a similar duty”). 
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into the particulars of the legal bond between the church and the 
perpetrator139 or between the church and the victim.140 But it is this 
very structure of analysis that should be of concern with respect to 
the institutional autonomy of religious organizations. 
Consider the relationship between a church organization and a 
member of its clergy. Some Roman Catholic bishops and other 
hierarchal church leaders, for example, have occasionally suggested 
that diocesan priests were not their employees at all, but 
“independent contractors.”141 As a public relations matter, this 
strategy might be disastrous, conjuring up a contrived and unseemly 
effort to escape moral culpability. But it is not legally absurd. The 
precise relationship between a Catholic bishop and diocesan priest, 
or an Episcopal bishop and a priest, is complex under canon law and 
church practice. More deeply, however, this example illustrates why 
the secular law should be exceedingly careful about imposing liability 
under such circumstances. Indeed, there are several intertwined and 
reinforcing reasons for caution in relying on a church’s “special” 
duties as a basis for liability. 
To begin with, the inquiry itself—whether into the question of 
employment or the question of fiduciary relation or the like—is itself 
potentially intrusive, entangling, and high-handed.142 Moreover, the 
task of translation risks a misreading of the internal logic of the 
 139. See, e.g., Enderle v. Trautman, No. CIV.13-01-22, 2001 WL 1820145, *14–16 
(D.N.D.); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 322–23 (Colo. 1993); Doe v. Corp. of 
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 98 P.3d 429, ¶ 11, 2004 UT 
App 274, ¶ 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a Mormon “high priest” accused of sexual 
abuse was not an employee, agent, or clergy member of the church because the church had no 
control over his conduct at the time at issue). 
 140. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409 
(2d Cir. 1999); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 309 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D. 
Conn. 2004); Moses, 863 P.2d 310; Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc., 738 
A.2d 839 (Me. 1999). 
 141. See Diana Jean Schemo & David M. Herszenhorn, Egan Is Leaving ‘Unfinished 
Work’ on Abuse, Victims Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2000, at B1 (“The diocese has also 
advanced a novel defense, arguing that priests are independent contractors. A lawyer for the 
diocese, Joseph T. Sweeney, likened the role of the diocese to that of the courts, which license 
attorneys but are not responsible for their behavior.”). In fact, this theory was not so novel. See 
Marianne Perciaccante, Note, The Courts and Canon Law, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 
202–03 (1996); cf. Medina v. Karcsinski, No. CV990365802, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2083, *18–19 (July 21, 2003) (raising issue in a suit arising out of an auto accident during a 
cross-country youth trip led by a parish priest); Brillhart v. Scheier, 758 P.2d 219, 222 (Kan. 
1988) (auto accident). 
 142. For a particularly thorough and incisive analysis of this problem, see Lupu & Tuttle, 
supra note 14, at 1834–45. 
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religious situation. In the Catholic context, for example, there is a 
good argument, which some church officials have advanced both as a 
canonical matter and as a secular legal strategy, that no secular 
category, whether “employee” or “independent contractor,” fully 
captures the nature of the relationship between bishop and priest.143 
Now, it might be argued that the task at hand is not to “translate” 
religious categories into secular terms, but just to apply secular law 
to a set of facts.144 Even under that conceptualization, however, the 
effect is to force a church to conform its behavior to the 
requirements of the secular legal pigeonhole that comes closest—
though perhaps not very close at all—to its own ecclesiastical reality. 
Recall here, again, that we are not talking about general duties, but 
about special duties arising out of “special relationships.” And the 
problem is that, rather than allowing churches to define those 
relationships in their own theological terms, a liability regime forces 
the church to behave according to one or the other of the standards 
that attach to those labels. As some courts have pointed out, 
subjecting churches under these conditions to suits for “negligent 
supervision” and the like is not very different from the almost 
universally rejected effort to subject individual ministers to causes of 
action for “clergy malpractice.”145
 143. As one commentator has bluntly put it: 
Misleading classifications of the relationship between the pastor and his diocesan 
bishop should be excluded [in the legal organization of a parish]. References to the 
pastor as an “employee” of a bishop, or a broad classification of the relationship 
under the respondeat superior theory provide an uncomfortable fit. Some authors 
attempt to evaluate whether a priest is an “agent” of a diocesan bishop or describe 
the priest as an “independent contractor.” These classifications should be used 
sparingly as they weaken proper understanding of the relationship between a pastor 
and bishop, suggesting a secular relationship which the courts may determine is 
susceptible to their review. It would be advisable to refrain from using these and 
other secular terms, such as independent contractor, when describing the 
relationship of a priest to the bishop. 
Sr. Mary Judith O’Brien, Instructions for Parochial Temporal Administration, 41 CATH. LAW. 
113, 139 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
 144. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 364 (Fla. 2002) (“The core inquiry in 
determining whether the Church Defendants are liable will focus on whether they reasonably 
should have foreseen the risk of harm to third parties. This is a neutral principle of tort law. 
Therefore, based on the allegations in the complaint, we do not foresee ‘excessive’ 
entanglement in internal church matters or in interpretation of religious doctrine or 
ecclesiastical law.”) 
 145. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Swanson v. 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 
S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997). 
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The most fundamental and foundational concern remains even if 
we assume that the secular law could be sufficiently deferential, 
nuanced, and accurate in its findings, and for that matter, even if 
underlying issues such as an employer-employee or fiduciary 
relationship are not formally in question. The real problem is that 
the state should not base a regime of responsibility or liability that 
potentially intrudes on internal church administration on causes of 
action (such as negligent supervision, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
the like) that, by definition, seek to regulate a relationship, the 
nature of which is grounded in religious concepts, considerations, 
and norms.146 Whatever “special relationships” might exist, or not 
exist, in the internal workings of a religious community, they should 
just be opaque to the gaze of secular law, at least when that law 
threatens to interfere with the internal discipline and organization of 
religious life. Religious institutional autonomy, understood as 
robustly as I have urged in the course of this Article, should at least 
demand that. 
To be sure, religious institutional autonomy is a complex and 
multivalent idea.147 In some contexts, the law has no choice but to 
put religious phenomena into secular pigeonholes. Indeed, to a large 
extent, the very ability of the law to treat churches as institutions 
with legal personality that act through the agency of natural persons 
depends on such pigeonholing.148 On the other hand, the law, in 
 146. Cf. Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2003) (rejecting an effort to ground a claim of plaintiff’s special vulnerability, and 
therefore a fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and priest, on plaintiff’s “deeply religious” 
disposition). 
 147. See supra Part III. 
 148. In this connection, it is important to concede that the claim of “vicarious liability,” 
which has also been urged in sexual abuse cases brought against churches, presents issues very 
different from those raised by causes of action for negligent supervision and the like. In 
evaluating vicarious liability, the question is not whether an employer should be held to a 
distinct set of responsibilities in its control of its employees, apart from the duties that the 
employees themselves owe. Rather, the problem is best understood as arising out of an 
unavoidable question of definition: In the face of an underlying act (such as an act of sexual 
abuse) for which, by hypothesis, the doer of that act should be liable, how can the law best 
conceptualize who that doer is? As Ernest Weinrib puts it, when the connection between an 
employee and an employer is sufficiently strong, and when the employee is acting within the 
scope of his employment, “the law constructs a more inclusive legal persona, the-employer-
acting-through-the-employee, to whom responsibility can be ascribed.” WEINRIB, supra note 
130, at 187. To be sure, there is another understanding of vicarious liability, as simply a 
distinct form of strict liability. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of 
Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1752 (1996) (criticizing Weinrib’s 
account). Even strict liability, however, would be less normatively entangling than imposing 
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various and varied contexts, has followed the salutary principle, 
whether under constitutional compulsion or not, of trying to treat 
religions alike, without undue regard to theological or organizational 
differences among them. Thus, for example, virtually all bona fide 
churches are treated as genuine “charitable” institutions, regardless 
of the actual, tangible, “public benefit” they provide.149 Or consider 
the obscure but deeply emblematic example of the “parsonage” 
exemption in tax law,150 under which all clergy persons are granted 
the same right to deduct the value of their housing, regardless of 
whether such housing would be treated under general principles of 
tax law as lodging that the “the employee is required to accept . . . 
on the business premises of his employer as a condition of 
employment.”151 The effect of this provision is to render opaque to 
the tax law, and avoid any inquiry into, the variety of ecclesiastical 
and organizational differences in the relation of churches to their 
clergy. Similarly, though with obviously much deeper stakes on both 
sides of the balance, in drawing the appropriate line between the 
important power of tort law to deal with sexual abuse and the 
autonomous jurisdiction of religious institutions in matters of their 
own government, the very sound of such phrases as “negligent 
supervision” and “fiduciary relationship,” and the parsing that they 
necessarily imply, should help make clear where that boundary 
belongs. 
the sort of duties implied by causes of action such as negligent supervision. See Lupu & Tuttle, 
supra note 14, at 190 (“Even if judicial determination of which entity has the powers to hire, 
supervise, and retain is constitutionally problematic when the plaintiff claims that a religious 
institution has been negligent in its performance of those functions, the constitutional problem 
might be avoidable when the court is analyzing a claim of vicarious liability.” (citations 
omitted)). 
Most courts have rejected vicarious liability claims in church sexual abuse cases on the 
grounds that such abuse is beyond the scope of the employment. See supra note 137, 139.  
 149. See Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664 (1970). For a general discussion of this 
principle, and a comparative look at the very different approach taken by British law, see Dane, 
supra note 17. 
 150. 26 U.S.C. § 107 (2004). 
 151. 26 U.S.C. § 119(a) (2) (2004). 
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2. The possibility of general duties, and alternatives in tort law 
Am I suggesting, then, that in effect churches should 
ordinarily152 be immune from suits arising out of sexual abuse of 
children by their clergy? Simply put, not necessarily. 
I have, for the sake of exposition, spoken so far in terms of 
“traditional” tort doctrine. But the “traditions” of tort law are no 
longer what they were. As one commentator explained, “It is a 
truism that tort law changed in character sometime in the middle of 
the twentieth century. At some point—maybe 1950, maybe 1960—
tort experienced . . . a plaintiff-oriented expansion.”153
As related to our topic, this expansion in tort liability has resulted 
in the stretching and reconsideration of the traditional categories of 
“special relationships,” most notably in the famous Tarasoff case,154 
which held that psychotherapists have a duty to use reasonable care 
to warn third parties threatened by their patients.155 Even more 
directly germane, however, has been the emergence of a set of 
rubrics under which courts have found liability for failures to protect 
outside the traditional paradigm of “special relations.” 
Some of these rubrics arise out of a defendant’s distinctive 
capacity or opportunity to protect others from harm. For example, 
while the traditional rule has been that landlords (unlike innkeepers) 
do not “owe an affirmative duty to protect tenants from criminal 
activity merely by reason of the relationship,”156 some courts have 
 152. Note, again, that I have narrowed the inquiry to exclude the sort of particularly 
egregious conduct that could qualify as “aiding and abetting” or “civil conspiracy.” See supra 
note 124. 
 153. Anthony J. Sebok, The Fall and Rise of Blame in American Tort Law, 68 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1031, 1031 (2003) (quoting THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE 
OF TORT LAW 46 (2001)). A detailed discussion of the sources, history, scope, character, and 
possible retrenchment of the various revolutions in American tort law is well beyond the scope 
of this article. For some guideposts, however, in addition to Sebok’s article, see also G. 
EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1985) (expanded ed. 
2003); John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003); 
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUDIES 461 (1985); Robert L. Rabin, The 
Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981); 
Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort 
Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992). 
 154. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
 155. Id. at 345. 
 156. Cf. Cramer v. Balcor Prop. Mgmt., 848 F. Supp. 1222 (D.S.C. 1994). For other 
cases adhering to this traditional position, see Hall v. Rental Mgmt, Inc., 913 S.W.2d 293 
(Ark. 1996); Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. 1988); see also Feld v. 
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modified or rejected that doctrine, requiring landlords under various 
circumstances to act reasonably to try to protect persons on their 
premises from the criminal attacks of tenants, invitees, or even 
trespassers.157 A different line of cases requires mobile ice cream 
vendors, for example, to use reasonable care to protect their young 
customers from the negligence of passing cars.158 In one of those 
cases, the Connecticut Supreme Court, notably, first invoked the 
boilerplate that without “some relationship . . . between the person 
injured and the defendant, by which the latter owes a duty to the 
former, there can be no liability for negligence,” but then held, in 
effect, that a duty-creating “relationship” exists whenever “the 
activities of two persons come so in conjunction that the failure by 
one to exercise that care is likely to cause injury to the other.”159 Also 
worth mentioning, if only to indicate the scope of the current 
discourse, are more cutting-edge, and often unsuccessful, 
movements, such as efforts to hold producers of violent 
entertainment liable on the basis of crimes committed by consumers 
of such entertainment.160
Another rubric, somewhat more grounded in traditional 
doctrine, emphasizes that malfeasance (as opposed to nonfeasance) 
Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 746 (Pa. 1984) (emphasizing “the crucial distinction between the 
risk of injury from a physical defect in the property, and the risk from the criminal act of a third 
person,” though conceding limited circumstances under which a landlord might be held liable 
for a failure to protect). 
 157. See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 132, § 18.7, at n.17. According to another treatise, 
the traditional rule 
has been under siege for decades now, and many courts have now imposed a duty of 
reasonable care to maintain the physical condition of the premises so as to minimize 
the risk of assaults and robberies, which often involve rapes and killings of women or 
sexual molestations of children. It may even be fair to say that the landlord always 
owes care that is reasonable in the light of all the circumstances. 
DOBBS, supra note 132, § 325, at 880–81. Landmark cases in this trend include, for example, 
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Mullins v. Pine 
Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1983); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 346 
A.2d 76 (N.J. 1975). 
 158. See, e.g., Neal v. Shields, Inc., 347 A.2d 102 (Conn. 1974); Thomas v. Goodies Ice 
Cream Co., 233 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio Ct. App. 1968). 
 159. Neal, 347 A.2d at 107–08 (quoting Borsoi v. Sparico, 106 A.2d 170 (Conn. 
1954)). 
 160. See, e.g., James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002); Sanders v. 
Acclaim Entm’t, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002) (suit arising out of Columbine 
shootings); Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. V-94-006, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at 
*31 (S.D. Tex. March 31, 1997). See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Controlling Communications 
That Teach or Demonstrate Violence: “The Movie Made Them Do It,” 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 47 
(2004). 
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can be actionable if that malfeasance results in physical harm. In one 
case, for example, in a state that adhered to the older rule protecting 
landlords, a particular landlord who undertook to “take care of the 
problem” of a tenant’s dangerous pit bulldog, but did not, was held 
liable to a victim that the dog subsequently mauled.161 The court’s 
language was particularly relevant for our purposes: The landlord had 
“no initial duty” to protect third parties 
from injuries caused by his tenants’ escaped pit bulldog. However, 
once he was cajoled . . . into doing something about the dog and 
then did something by way of enforcing a rather specific plan for 
securing the dog, he was in a position of having engaged in an 
undertaking to assure performance of [the tenant’s] duty to protect 
others against the risk of dog attack. This undertaking was not 
possible without the power that [the landlord] had to impose the 
terms of the undertaking; but, still, [the landlord’s] duty to the 
world . . . was a duty as an ordinary person and not as a landlord.162
In another case, a South Dakota court held that 
On the whole, we recognize no general duty to protect one’s 
fellow human beings from crime, and that rule equally applies to 
the ordinary relationship of landlord and tenant. If a duty exists for 
such protection, it must originate from some special relationship 
imposing an obligation to protect another from crime based on a 
position of dependence intrinsic to the relationship. A special 
relationship can occur between common carriers and passengers, 
innkeepers and guests, business owners and invitees, and employers 
and employees. . . . 
 On the other hand, the special relationship test is not the only 
rule applicable in this case. There are compelling reasons to depart 
from the restrictive common law conception of landlord liability for 
 161. Wright v. Schum, 781 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Nev. 1989). The Wright court relied in 
part on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A: 
  One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person 
or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third 
person, or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person 
upon the undertaking. 
 162. Wright, 781 P.2d at 1146 (emphasis added). 
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leasehold injuries. . . . A home is a citadel, and its integrity 
depends, at least in part, on its locks. A locked door is the first 
defense to a violent world. Landlords who insist on control over 
decisions on changing tenant locks may bear some limited 
responsibility to their tenants when locks need to be changed or 
repaired in the face of foreseeable imminent danger. We conclude 
that although no special relationship was created in this 
circumstance, the policy controlling the changing of tenant locks 
placed defendants in a position of heightened responsibility to their 
tenants.163
Similarly, the act of giving a loaded gun to someone known to 
be inclined to use it violently might be actionable even in the 
absence of any “special” duty.164 As one court explained, 
Generally, with respect to nonfeasance, there is no legal duty that 
obligates a person to aid or protect another. An exception has 
developed where a special relationship exists between the persons. 
However, defendant’s act of handing a loaded gun to [his son] was 
not one of nonfeasance, but rather misfeasance. Therefore, the 
special relationship doctrine is inapplicable . . . . 165
Less dramatically, but just as evocatively, persons might have a 
duty not to lull others into complacency. Thus, for example, 
misleading letters of recommendation, even in the absence of a 
“special relationship,” can become the basis for liability if physical 
injury results.166
 163. Smith v. Lagow Constr. & Dev. Corp., 2002 S.D. 37, ¶¶ 12–14, 642 N.W.2d 187, 
190–91. 
 164. Ross v. Glaser, 559 N.W.2d 331 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 
 165. Id. at 334 (citations omitted). 
 166. See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997). 
Regarding misrepresentation, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 provides that: 
An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical 
harm which results from an act done by the other or a third person in reliance upon 
the truth of the representation, if the actor 
(a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is likely to induce 
action by the other, or a third person, which involves an unreasonable risk of 
physical harm to the other, and 
(b) knows 
(i) that the statement is false, or 
(ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes. 
Similarly, § 311 provides that: 
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such 
information, where such harm results 
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All these cases and doctrines are fluid and controversial. One 
important reason is that, lurking beneath their surface, and 
sometimes right at their surface, is an entirely alternative account of 
tort law, an account that is, for better or worse,167 deeply skeptical168 
of the sharp “duty/no duty” dichotomy on which the traditional 
rules were built.169 This alternative tradition found famous seminal 
expression, for example, in Judge Andrew’s dissent from Judge 
Cardozo’s even more famous majority opinion in the Palsgraf 
case.170 In that dissent, Andrews argued that the question of “duty” 
was not something apart from the other questions in a tort case, such 
as reasonableness and causation, but rather arose out of those other 
issues: “Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining 
(a) to the other, or 
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the 
action taken. 
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care 
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or 
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated. 
 167. My own aim here is not to opine on the ideal state of tort law, but only to discuss 
the interaction of tort law and religious institutional autonomy. 
 168. Cf. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the 
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001) (discussing “duty-
skepticism”). Classic sources include, for example, W.W. Buckland, The Duty To Take Care, 51 
L.Q. REV. 637, 639 (1935) (stating that the concept of duty is “an unnecessary fifth wheel on 
the coach, incapable of sound analysis and possibly productive of injustice.”); William L. 
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953); Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tortious 
Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 41 (1934) (arguing that a concept of duty did not appear in 
tort law until the middle of the nineteenth century and was unnecessary to sound analysis). For a 
more recent contribution to this critical literature, see Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, 
Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (2002), at http://www.bepress.com/ 
til/default/vol3/iss2/art3 (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). 
 169. For discussions of the history of these two accounts and their interaction, see 3 
HARPER ET AL., supra note 132, § 18.2; Goldberg, supra note 153; Goldberg & Zipursky, 
supra note 168, at 692–93; Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 97 (1994) 
(discussing the “growth and consolidation of the paradigm of reasonableness in modern and 
post-modern American tort law and to the steady, albeit slow, reconceptualization of tort duty 
and negligence law”); David Owen, Duty Rules, 54 VAND. L. REV. 767 (2001); Rabin, supra 
note 153. 
As Goldberg and Zipursky point out, the term “duty” has many meanings, and 
skepticism about “duty” can take many forms. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 168, at 660–
64. In this discussion, I am referring, not to a jurisprudential skepticism about the coherence 
of the notion of “duty,” but a normative skepticism about whether, in tort law, the finding of a 
relation of a specific “duty” between plaintiff and defendant needs to precede the inquiry into 
whether the defendant unreasonably put the plaintiff at risk of harm. 
I am also excluding from my discussion here broader issues in the normative theory of 
tort, such as critiques of the entire “fault” system itself. 
 170. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
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from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of 
others.”171 Variations on this view have also for much of the 
twentieth century been taken up by commentators who urged the 
rejection of arguably arbitrary categories of “duty” and “no duty” in 
favor of a single, broadly defined, duty to act reasonably under the 
circumstances.172 It has even found its way, at least to some extent, 
into draft versions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.173
More saliently for our purposes, this idea of general duties has 
been taken up by at least some state courts.174 The Tarasoff court, for 
 171. Id. at 103. Some trace back this idea to Judge Brett’s opinion in the late nineteenth-
century English Court of Appeals case of Heaven v. Pender: 
  [W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with 
regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once 
recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with 
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or 
property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such 
danger. 
11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (C.A. 1883) (Brett, M.R.). 
 172. Most notably among mainstream doctrinal scholars are PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 357–58 (5th ed. 1984) (arguing that concept of duty is not 
doctrinally useful, and that it “is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of 
policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection”). 
As particularly relevant to our issue—liability for a failure to protect against harms 
caused by third parties—see, for example, John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of 
Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties To 
Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867, 870 (“[I]n lieu of the traditional approach, 
courts should impose upon a defendant nothing more nor less than an obligation to act 
reasonably under the circumstances unless, on balance, there are recognized policy concerns 
that militate against the imposition of that duty. The decision can be made adequately whether 
the defendant’s behavior is characterized as misfeasance or nonfeasance, and whether or not 
the parties share a ‘special relationship,’ as long as a court explicitly analyzes the same kinds of 
factors that might in other situations prevent it from imposing a duty to behave reasonably.”); 
James P. Murphy, Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 147, 170–
73 (1980). For one important, broader analytic account, see Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 
49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (1999). 
 173. Rather than treating the existence of a relational “duty” as a fundamental 
prerequisite to tort liability, the draft of the Third Restatement states simply that “[a]n actor is 
subject to liability for negligent conduct that is a legal cause of physical harm,” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (Discussion Draft), and then qualifies that broad principle with the 
incidental assertion that “[e]ven if the defendant’s negligent conduct is the legal cause of the 
plaintiff’s physical harm, the defendant is not liable for that harm if the court determines that 
the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff. Findings of no duty are unusual, and are based on 
judicial recognition of special problems of principle or policy that justify the withholding of 
liability.” Id. § 6. For critical discussions, see Symposium, 54 VAND. L. REV. (2001). 
 174. I am not suggesting an unstoppable, or even unidirectional, line of development. If 
anything, the current trend seems to be to the contrary. In the words of one commentator: 
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example, while nominally holding that a psychiatrist’s duty to warn 
arose out of the “special relation” between the psychiatrist and his 
patient, also broadly suggested that the underlying principles at stake 
had more to do with considerations of foreseeability and a balancing 
of the parties’ interests.175 In other states, this view is explicit. The 
Oregon Supreme Court, for example, has emphasized the centrality 
of a particularized finding of foreseeability to determinations of 
liability and has suggested that references to “duty” are often verbal 
distractions.176 Even more bluntly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has 
Coincident with the election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency in 1980, the 
expansionary period of tort law came to a rather screeching halt. Courts and 
commentators increasingly began to recognize the perils of the previous 
generation’s failure to focus on the proper limits of tort law—on its failure to 
understand that tort law, like almost everything, is an evil in excess. Providing 
limitations on the reach of negligence and other types of tort claims is of course the 
basic office of the duty/no-duty concept, so that the beginning point of duty’s 
resurgence may itself be fairly dated at about 1980. . . . During the 1980s and 
1990s, in one context after another, courts increasingly turned away from simple 
foreseeability to some enriched version of duty in helping decide the proper limits 
on tort responsibility. As the twentieth century drew to a close, the increasing 
control by no-duty and limited-duty principles over the reach of tort law was widely, 
although by no means universally, endorsed by the commentators. 
David Owen, supra note 169, at 775–76. 
 175. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342–46 (1976); see Lake, 
supra note 169, at 102, 127–28 (“Tarasoff challenges the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
approach to many ‘no duty’ questions, particularly in the rescue context, as well as traditional 
conceptualizations of ‘duty.’” The opinion also “expanded the notion of a special relationship 
in a way that uncannily, if not explicitly, calls for eradication or amelioration of rules of no duty 
derived from or originating in ‘common law’ type ideas of ‘nonfeasance,’ such as those set 
forth in the Restatement itself.”); Adler, supra note 172; Murphy, supra note 172, at 170–73. 
The significance of Tarasoff also must be understood in relation to the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), which held, in 
the context of a reconsideration of landowners’ duties to persons on landowner property, that 
the basic policy of this state . . . is that everyone is responsible for an injury caused to 
another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property. The 
factors which may in particular cases warrant departure from this fundamental 
principle do not warrant the wholesale immunities resulting from the common law 
classifications [among trespassers, licensees, and invitees], and we are satisfied that 
continued adherence to the common law distinctions can only lead to injustice or, if 
we are to avoid injustice, further fictions with the resulting complexity and 
confusion. 
Id. at 118–19. 
 176. “Defendants sometimes deny liability . . . by arguing that although they may have 
breached a duty to someone, it was not a ‘duty to’ the plaintiff. But that argument can be more 
directly phrased in terms of foreseeability, and perhaps other reasons for extending or limiting 
the scope of liability for defendant’s negligence, than by using the conclusory word ‘duty’ as a 
premise.” Cain v. Rijken, 717 P.2d 140 (Or. 1986) (action against a hospital for negligently 
allowing a psychiatric patient to drive an automobile). In a more extended discussion of the 
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emphasized that “reliance upon a no duty-no liability theory is 
misplaced in Wisconsin: ‘duty’ exists when it is established that it was 
foreseeable that an act or omission to act may cause harm to 
someone.”177 The court further states that under this 
broad definition of duty, we need not engage in analytical 
gymnastics to arrive at our result by first noting that at common 
law, a person owes no duty to control the conduct of another 
person or warn of such conduct, and then finding exception to that 
general rule where the defendant stands in a special relationship to 
either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a 
relationship to the foreseeable victim of the conduct.178
C. General Duties and Religious Institutional Liability 
The import of all these developments in tort law might be this: I 
have argued that we need to worry about holding churches liable in 
sexual abuse cases on the basis of “duties” grounded in “special 
relationships” that exist in the internal life of the religious 
community. That concern is sharply reduced, however, if a church 
can be held liable on the basis of a duty that is general rather than 
special,179 whether that general duty arises out of a narrow rubric 
such as the nonfeasance/malfeasance distinction, or—in those 
jurisdictions where such a move might be available—out of a more 
fundamental rejection of the “no duty” paradigm at its core. 
relevance of “duty,” the Oregon Supreme Court similarly warned that “phrasing a conclusion 
in a particular case in terms of ‘duty’ or ‘no duty,’ without reference to any external standard, 
tends to turn into an apparent rule of law what may be only a determination concerning 
foreseeability in the circumstances of that case.” Fazzorali v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 
P.2d 1326, 1335 (Or. 1987). 
 177. Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 165 (Wis. 1988). 
 178. Id. at 165 n.3. 
 179. Interestingly, this distinction resembles the line drawn in some state doctrines of 
parental tort immunity. In those states, children can sue their parents for breach of duties the 
parents owe to the “world at large,” but not for breach of those special duties the parents owe 
as parents. See, e.g., Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974); Broadwell v. Holmes, 
871 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tenn. 1994); see also Sandoval v. Sandoval, 623 P.2d 800, 803 (Ariz. 
1981), overruled by Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43 (Ariz. 1995). The analogy is 
especially striking because the principal consequence of the rule is to immunize parents from 
suits for “negligent supervision.” See Sandoval, 623 P.2d 800; Squeglia v. Squeglia, 661 A.2d 
1007, 1012 (Conn. 1995) (“[T]he doctrine of parental immunity is particularly applicable in 
the area of parental supervision and discretion with respect to the care and control of a minor 
child.”); Holodook, 324 N.E.2d 338. 
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Limiting church liability to causes of action that can be 
understood in such “general” terms would be conceptually more 
consistent with a healthy respect for religious institutional autonomy. 
More important, it would frame the issues in a way that is less 
intrusive into internal church affairs. Rather than speaking in terms 
of the vagaries of how a church “hires” or “retains” or “supervises” 
or fulfills its “fiduciary” obligations, a court could simply ask, in a 
focused and specific fashion, whether a church acted negligently in 
putting a child in harm’s way. Under this approach, an abusing 
clergyperson would be treated as analogous (analytically though by 
no means morally) to a physical hazard on which a victim slips and 
falls, and suffers traumatic injuries. 
D. Not Quite 
This cannot be the end of the matter, however. Simply shifting 
from “specific” to “general” causes of action would not be, in itself, 
a cure-all. To begin with, the sort of “policy” inquiries implicit in at 
least some expansions of tort duty180 would themselves run the risk 
of subjecting churches to unarticulated and perhaps arbitrary 
judgments about their distinctive responsibility as churches.181 
Indeed, it is worth considering in this connection, for example, that 
some courts have justified the sort of broad landlord responsibility I 
discussed earlier on the basis of a “social consensus” present in 
 180. See, e.g., Zamstein v. Marvasti, 692 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1997); Kolbe v. State, 625 
N.W.2d 721, 728 (Iowa 2001) (“In determining whether a defendant owes a legal duty to the 
plaintiff, three factors usually govern our analysis: (1) the relationship between the parties, (2) 
reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person who is injured, and (3) public policy 
considerations. We use these factors under a balancing approach and not as three distinct and 
necessary elements. In the end, whether a duty exists is a policy decision based upon all 
relevant considerations that guide us to conclude a particular person is entitled to be protected 
from a particular type of harm.” (citation omitted)); Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 
(Wis. 1988) (embracing a broad definition of duty to protect third parties, but also 
emphasizing that a wide range of “public policy” considerations could preclude liability in 
particular classes of cases). 
 181. Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1740–41 (1998) (“At a more basic level, Holmesian skepticism about 
duty has not merely failed to explain the contours of negligence doctrine. It has rendered 
problematic the very institution of the common law of torts. . . . The Holmes-Prosser model 
has proved equally inept at generating a framework for analyzing negligence problems. Its core 
claim—that negligence turns on judicial policy analysis of the costs and benefits of different 
liability rules—tends to leave judges and juries to decide cases by means of the arbitrary, 
indeterminate, and doctrinally unstable device of factor balancing.”) 
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modern life.182 Similarly, the particularized inquiry implicit in some 
notions of a broad duty to act reasonably to prevent harm—the 
particularized inquiries suggested, for example, in the Oregon and 
Wisconsin decisions I have quoted183—might well reproduce, 
without at least the saving grace of settled doctrine, the intrusive 
examination of internal church affairs. Moreover, to the extent that 
broader doctrines of duty often shift the responsibility for making 
controversial value choices from judge to juries,184 extending the 
duty might simply render the threat of intrusion or prejudice less 
transparent. 
Another concern arises out of the larger landscape of 
contemporary tort discourse: The type of broad conceptions of 
liability I have discussed can easily be grounded in a search for less 
arbitrary, more normatively sound, conceptions of duty and 
responsibility. They can also arise, though, out of a search for “deep 
pockets”185 or a purely compensatory conception of “enterprise 
liability.”186 To that extent, however, tort liability for churches can 
 182. See Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1983); cf. Trusiani v. 
Cumberland & York Distrib., Inc., 538 A.2d 258, 261 (Me. 1988) (“In the decision of 
whether or not there is a duty, many factors interplay: the hand of history, our ideals of morals 
and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the 
loss should fall. In the end the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the 
mores of the community always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in 
each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind.” 
(citations and internal quotations omitted)). 
 183. Cain v. Rijken, 717 P.2d 140 (Or. 1986); Schuster, 424 N.W.2d at 165. 
 184. The classic discussion of this issue is found in the work of Leon Green. E.g., LEON 
GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 
COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928). For more recent treatments, see DOBBS, supra note 132, at § 
182; William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1699 
(1997); L. Rabin, The Duty Concept in Negligence Law: A Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787, 
792 (2001); David W. Robertson, Negligence Liability for Crimes and Intentional Torts 
Committed by Others, 67 TUL. L. REV. 135, 138 (1992); Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-
Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 
1977 UTAH L. REV. 1, 33 (1977). 
 185. Cf. PETER HUBER, THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); 
Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Charles W. Thomas, Third Party Tort Remedies for Crime 
Victims—Searching for the “Deep Pocket” and a Risk Free Society, 18 STETSON L. REV. 1, 33 
(1988). 
 186. For discussions of notions of “enterprise liability” and their role in more expansive 
conceptions of tort liability, see, for example, Virginia E. Nolen & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise 
Liability and the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 835 (1996); Priest, supra 
note 153; Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. 
REV. 1190 (1996); Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law: The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 184 (1987); Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory, 28 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 919 (1994). 
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degenerate into a form of taxation that—contrary to principles of 
both neutrality and religious institutional autonomy—ends up 
penalizing historically entrenched and hierarchal churches simply 
because they tend to have a large fund of assets sitting under one 
legal title. Indeed, with regard to the Roman Catholic Church in 
particular, this sort of “taxation” based on organizational form is 
doubly pernicious to the extent that it also feeds into a traditional 
American bigotry against Catholic clericalism.187
Finally, particular lawsuits, or particular causes of action, or 
particular remedies might still raise other problems, entirely apart 
from any I have discussed so far, and outside the scope of this 
Article. 
I will, however, cut the dialectic short here. My goal has not 
been to propose a definitive resolution, but rather to illustrate the 
complex interaction of a robust respect for religious institutional 
autonomy and an equally robust recognition that churches, as actors 
in society, cannot be entirely immune from the demands of secular 
law. In a sense I am suggesting that, to cross the threshold between 
secular law and religious nomos, tort law must get it “just right”—
not too cold and not too hot, not too narrow and not too expansive. 
How this would all work out, in the final analysis, in suits against 
churches arising out of sexual abuse by their clergy, I am simply not 
sure. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE IRONIES OF AUTONOMY 
You will notice, I hope, something of an irony here. For I have 
returned, in a sense, to the Smith notion of “neutral, generally 
applicable laws,” suggesting that a church could be held liable by 
virtue of neutral, general rules that do not rely on the “special” 
character of relations within the religious community. A church, that 
is to say, should be held liable, if at all, only for the same reasons that 
any one of us might be liable if we undertake to protect a vulnerable 
person, and botch it, or if we write misleading letters of 
 187. One sociologist, for example, has argued that the focus on sexual abuse in the 
Catholic Church in recent years arises not out of any greater incidence of misconduct by 
Catholic clergy, but out of a combination of, among other things, persistent anti-Catholic 
bigotry, traceable as far back as lurid Puritan tales of alleged Catholic sexual misconduct, the 
perceived deep pockets of a hierarchal church, and the wealth of diocesan records detailing 
personnel complaints going back many years. PHILIP JENKINS, PEDOPHILES AND PRIESTS: 
ANATOMY OF A CONTEMPORARY CRISIS (2001). 
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recommendation, or if we call a child across the street in the face of a 
careening automobile. 
To some extent, this move reflects the genuine normative pull of 
ideas of generality and neutrality, a pull that, for better or worse, 
helps explain the holding in Smith and also helps explain the 
misreading of Jones v. Wolf, which I criticized in Part III of this 
Article. But notice how my argument here depends on 
understanding how “general” laws need to appreciate the “special” 
character of religious autonomy. In particular, the “neutral, generally 
applicable laws” I have in mind as potential sources of legitimate 
church liability are those that do not require trying to make secular 
sense of, or translate, the internal nomic reality of a religious 
institution or community. For while, in some contexts, the need for 
such translation is part of what might be required to guarantee 
autonomy, in other contexts, it is a threat to at least one sense of 
what autonomy requires. Indeed, this is the real point of connection 
between the idea of “neutral, generally applicable laws” in Smith and 
the notion of “neutral principles of laws” in Jones v. Wolf. For while 
some courts have used the “neutral principles of laws” language to 
justify intrusion into the internal life of churches, the real import of 
Jones is just the opposite.188 Just as the Jones Court understood, in 
the church property context, the difficulties inherent in trying to 
reduce the structure of authority in churches into neat pigeonholes 
such as “hierarchal” or “congregational,” and allowed resort to 
secular legal instruments as a way to avoid that inquiry, courts 
deciding sexual abuse cases should themselves be more cautious 
about fitting the various bonds of authority and affiliation of a 
church into the sort of neat pigeonholes on which the tort law idea 
of “special relationships” is built. 
It is a fair question at this point, of course, why we should care 
about religious institutional autonomy in the first place, and why a 
simpler, more acidic, version of “neutrality” or “generality” should 
not rule after all. I have, in this Article, almost stubbornly avoided a 
direct defense of religious autonomy, satisfying myself instead with 
shoring it up against various points of attack. The reason for this is 
partly a matter of choice about the scope and emphasis of this 
particular Article. But it is also more basic: while I appreciate efforts 
to understand and defend religious autonomy functionally or 
 188. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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historically,189 I also believe that, in the end, respect for autonomy 
must rest on an essentially existential encounter with the “otherness” 
of the religious nomos.190 For only that sort of existential insight can, 
with full conviction, reconceive and resituate the genuine and 
entirely legitimate pull of principles such as neutrality and generality. 
There is, therefore, also a deeper irony in the discussion here. 
For all my efforts to distinguish the problem of exemptions from the 
problem of institutional autonomy—an effort by which I stand—the 
notion of institutional autonomy is yet again an emblem for a larger 
consideration of free exercise. This consideration must be left to 
another day. Suffice it to say that the challenge in both instances is to 
recognize how the application of otherwise apparently workaday 
general laws sometimes takes on a special, problematic charge when 
it seeks to reach across the fragile but vital gap that divides the 
secular and religious normative imaginations. 
 
 
 189. In this Conference, consider, for example, Kathleen A. Brady, Religious 
Organizations and Free Exercise: the Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633; Ira 
C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. 
REV. 1789; Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217. 
 190. I have made this sort of point before. See Perry Dane, Maps of Sovereignty: A 
Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959 (1991) (“The recognition of another sovereign does 
not serve a purpose, as such, though purposes can be articulated for it. It is more of an 
existential encounter, a fact—if a socially constructed fact—of the world.”); Perry Dane, The 
Intersecting Worlds of Religious and Secular Marriage, in 4 LAW AND RELIGION: CURRENT 
LEGAL ISSUES 385 (Richard O’Dair & Andrew Lewis eds., 2001) (“[T]he impulse to 
appreciating legal pluralism arises, not merely out of theoretical commitments, but out of a 
process of existential encounter, as each normative system asks itself precisely what is going on 
outside the reach of its most solipsistic concerns.”); Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, 
supra note 18. 
